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ABSTRACT
The enactment of the 1998 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Reform Act resulted
directly from perceived lapses in the federal taxation administration, which was publicly
highlighted in Congressional hearings. Congress reacted by fundamentally altering the
IRS’s implementation of the Internal Revenue Code (for the first time since 1952). The
Joint Committee on Taxation noted that the overall objective of the 1998 IRS Reform Act
was to have “a well-run IRS [which] is critical to the operation of our tax system.”
From a public administration paradigm, the IRS moved from a traditional tax
management methodology to a New Public Management (NPM) methodology.
Traditional tax management focused on efficiency and effectiveness typically measured
by tax collections per dollar spent. NPM focuses on “performance based” activities
emphasizing the responsiveness to the needs of taxpayers. Ultimately, the IRS’s core
function remains the annual collection of nearly $2 trillion in taxes.
The effects of the 1998 IRS Reform Act on the IRS’s administration were
assessed within the context of this paradigm shift in management. Partial replication of
the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey showed taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS have
not improved. In fact, the IRS’s receipt of top quality service evaluations universally
decreased. Analysis of selected enforcement/compliance data showed that the number of
IRS auditors is inversely related to the annual tax gap. The data of this dissertation,
however, indicated that the 1998 IRS Reform Act resulted in better taxpayer compliance.
Examination of the IRS’s personnel data shows that IRS executives have not received
private pay parity, and the IRS strategically misrepresented §1203 employee termination
violations in 2003.

vii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998 (hereafter, the 1998 IRS Reform Act) transpired as a direct result of perceived
lapses in the administration of federal taxation. Major failures in almost all areas of tax
administration and enforcement posture were publicly highlighted in Congressional
hearings leading up to the 1998 IRS Reform Act. At the time, the IRS was publicly
portrayed as no less than “evil”1 in televised Congressional hearings.

Congress

subsequently passed the 1998 IRS Reform Act with overwhelming majorities of 402-8 in
the House and 96-2 in the Senate.

Significantly, the last major reform of IRS

administration occurred 46 years earlier in 1952.
The objective of the ensuing legislation was to improve the overall tax
administration with an emphasis on taxpayer responsiveness. To achieve this legislative
mandate for reform, Congress required the IRS to change its mission statement. The
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) observed that the IRS subsequently established three
strategic goals of providing “top quality service to each taxpayer,” providing “top quality
service to all taxpayers” (enforcement), and “providing IRS employees with a quality
work environment” to facilitate the required changes (JCT 2003, 1).
The objective of this research project is to examine U.S. tax administration before
and after the 1998 IRS Reform Act within the theory of New Public Management (NPM).
This theory is modeled under a governmental system that was mandated to shift from a
rigid bureaucratic structure to a more responsive system.

The 1998 IRS Reform

Act resulted in the IRS shifting existing resources to customer services from

1

Former IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander (1973 to 1977), National Tax Journal Symposium 1998,
35).
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enforcement. An examination of this legislation from a tax policy perspective generates
the following central research questions:
What were the actual effects of the “landmark” 1998 IRS Reform Act? Has the
Act resulted in an overall positive, negative, or no change in U.S. tax
administration from both a public perception and an internal taxation
administration perspectives?
As the JCT (1998, 1) observed, “a well-run IRS is critical to the operation of our tax
system.” The degree of progress or deterioration since the 1998 IRS Reform Act can be
assessed empirically. An evaluation of these changes can assess whether the IRS is
moving towards, away from, or is unchanged in achieving the overall aim of “a well-run
IRS.”
Three main sets of hypotheses focus on pre- and post- enactment on the changes
to the:


Public’s perception of the IRS (1990 compared to 2004)



IRS’s enforcement posture (1981-2003)



IRS’s personnel environment (1998-2003)

In 1990, the IRS commissioned a comprehensive nationwide survey of taxpayers
to obtain their overall perception of its administration of the U.S. tax system. NPMrelated questions from this survey were re-asked to taxpayers to determine any potential
changes in response patterns. Enforcement data that centers on the Bureau of Economic
Analysis - Adjusted Gross Income Gap (BEA-AGIG) was analyzed for any potential
effects on taxpayers’ compliance. Internal IRS personnel data reported in mandated
annual Congressional Reports on the effect of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was examined to
assess the potential changes in the IRS’s work environment.
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These sets of diverse information sources were utilized to proxy for the IRS’s
administration and enforcement postures to determine whether a transformation in the
quality of tax administration, either constructive or unconstructive, has occurred since
1998 (allowing for a triangulation of data sources and measurements).
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 14) asked, “Why is accounting and auditing
practice like it is?”

This dissertation in a broad sense asks, “Why is taxation

administration like it is?” The objective is to “explain and predict the phenomena” of a
tax system’s movement from a traditional management approach towards an NPM
approach (i.e., test of NPM). U.S. tax administration was comprehensively examined
through the lens of a tax policy framework.
1.1 1998 IRS Reform Act
On July 22, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the 1998 IRS Reform Act.
This Act marked the end product of a three-year effort to Congressionally overhaul the
administration of the IRS. Momentum for the Act occurred during Congressional tax
hearings, and new significant provisions for taxpayers were a direct result of these
proceedings.

Hevrdejs (1998, 1) noted that the “fundamental tenets of tax law

procedure” were altered in the areas of:


“Shifting the burden of proof”



“Extending attorney-client provision to accountants and enrolled agents”



“More liberal compromise procedures”



“Interest, penalties and innocent spouse relief”

Hevrdejs observed that the battlefield between taxpayers and the IRS on the most basic
level was altered, and the “IRS is likely to be an organization in transition for some
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time.” See Appendix I for a listing of major provisions contained in the 1998 IRS
Reform Act.2
Former Democratic Senator J. Robert Kerrey and Republican Representative Rob
Portman initiated this semi-bipartisan legislation. Relative to his view that the IRS was
unfair to taxpayers, Senator Kerrey stated, “We have changed the law to change that
perception” (Donmoyer 1998). The Act was historical, as the IRS (2000, 1) observed:
The Internal Revenue Service was established in its current form in 1952, in the
wake of corruption scandals and a Presidential Commission. The objective was
to create an agency that would collect federal taxes according to the law without
political or corrupt influence. The IRS mission statement, written in the 1960s
and in effect until 1998, reflected the way the agency saw itself and was seen by
the public. Its operative words were “collect the proper amount of tax.”

The fundamental reform effort underlying the 1998 IRS Reform Act is reflected
in the requirement that the long-standing mission statement of the agency be abandoned.
Congress specifically called upon the IRS to change its mission statement in §1002 to
emphasize the importance of serving taxpayers. The IRS subsequently eliminated any
mention of collections in its revised statement and importantly called for “top quality
service.” The new IRS Mission Statement reads (IRS 2000, 1):
Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and
meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and
fairness to all.
In stark contrast, the prior IRS mission statement focused on “collecting the proper
amount of tax” and read as follows (JCT 1998, 16):

2

This Act was massive in scale and covered provisions other than those directly related to reform. This
dissertation focuses on Title I through Title IV of the 1998 IRS Reform Act that the IRS addressed with its
three stated goals (taxpayer service, enforcement, and IRS work environment).
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The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of
tax revenue at the least cost; serve the public by continually improving the
quality of our products and services; and perform in a manner warranting the
highest degree of public confidence in our integrity and fairness.
The dynamics of the 1997 and 1998 Congressional tax hearings that led to the
1998 Tax Reform Act (which mandated fundamental changes in the collection activities
of the IRS) resulted in the IRS reacting in a predictable fashion. As Bergin and Brown
(2003) observed, the “message” to the IRS was to “back off enforcement” and
“enforcement statistics” clearly show that the IRS got the message. They observed that
the new IRS mission statement does not even mention the core IRS function of collecting
taxes.
The political process inherent in taxation results in the convergence of competing
interests in a dramatic fashion. This competition for favorable tax treatment is a timehonored fabric of the political reality. The 1998 Tax Reform Act resulted from anti-IRS
sentiments/forces coming together, and this Act fundamentally affected the IRS’s
collection enforcement posture. However, from an economic standpoint, “the reliable
tenacity of the tax collector” is often assumed. The question thus becomes, “is this
assumption valid, given the current state of the tax system?” Additionally, how have the
changes mandated in the 1998 IRS Reform Act affected taxpayer service and IRS
personnel?
1.2 Symposium of IRS Commissioners
The National Tax Journal in May 1998 held a tax symposium on the then
upcoming tax legislation. A panel of four former IRS Commissioners was convened to
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discuss different aspects of the existing legislative environment.3 Questions centered on
the possible deficiency in the then current legislative proposals, the potential influence on
enforcement/compliance, the prior data collection methods of the IRS,4 the effect on IRS
employees, and the overall role of the IRS (among other issues).
Relative to the alleged IRS orientation “that the IRS culture views taxpayers as
the enemy,” former IRS Commissioner Goldberg replied (National Tax Journal
Symposium 1998, 425):
To a great extent we have a system that does view the taxpayer as the enemy. I
believe that perspective is more all-pervasive than we want to acknowledge in
public conversation. I believe that perspective is not a function of the
workforce; I believe it is a function of the message the workforce has been
given.
Former Commissioner Alexander observed that the IRS was “demonized” mainly for
political expediency.
Ex-commissioner Richardson asked whether it was “the system created by
Congress or the system created by the IRS.” The IRS mission was noted to be highly
complex, and she argued that “the regime has gotten out of control.”

Former

Commissioner Goldberg stated, “They’re being asked to administer a tax system that is
largely incomprehensible.” The Commissioners observed within this environment that it

3

Former IRS Commissioners Donald C. Alexander (1973 to 1977), Fred T. Goldberg (1989 to 1992) and
Margaret M. Richardson (1993-1997) were discussants. Former Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs (1986
to 1989) submitted written comments.
4
Specifically mentioned were the interrelated Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) and
Discriminant Information Function (DIF). The TCMP was a line-by-line audit utilized by the IRS to
compile compliance data. The TCMP was last conducted in 1988. The DIF assigns a numerical weight to a
tax return, the higher the DIF score the greater probability of an audit [under §6103(b)(2) the score is
specifically protected from public disclosure]. The panelists noted one effective product of the TCMP was
a change that required the reporting of Social Security numbers for dependents in 1986. A year after
institution approximately 7 million out of 77 million dependents disappeared from the U.S. tax system. In
2002, the National Research Program (NRP) was initiated, with some claiming it is a resurrection of
TCMP. The first stage of the NRP is currently under way (Bonacum and Allen 2002, and Alexander 2003).
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was amazing the system functioned “as well as it did.”

Former Commissioner

Richardson stated (National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 434):
One my biggest disappointments about the hearings in the fall and again this
spring is that there really has been no balance and no sense of perspective, and
no effort to bring it to bear or very little effort, I should say.

Former Commissioner Goldberg noted, “The hearings were political theater” and the
corresponding process was politicized “to show how really evil [the] IRS is and how it
preys on people and destroys their rights and their liberties.”
Former Commissioner Richardson observed that the heightened political nature of
the taxation process at the time was affecting the orientation of the tax legislation. She
observed it was “the political system, not just the tax system” that was demanding
changes.
The future effect of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) on enforcement was
identified as an area of concern. Former Commissioner Alexander predicted that the
“grey area” between tax avoidance and evasion would be expanded with more taxpayers
willing to take more aggressive positions. He also expressed concern about preserving a
sufficient amount of tax compliance, and openly asked if this situation was “a race to the
bottom.” Former Commissioner Alexander noted that “still [the] IRS needs to have a
strong, effective, and responsible compliance component to make the system work.”
Relative to shifting the burden of proof to the IRS, former Commissioner Goldberg noted
(National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 419):
I think the problem with it is that it can provide certain incentives to the IRS that
are going to cause the agency to act in a manner very different from the way I
think Congress is expecting.
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This potential for unintended consequences was an area of concern. Former
Commissioner Richardson observed the continual conflict that the IRS faces in
administering tax laws.

She reflected on Congressional demands that were polar

opposites. She stated (National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 416):
I testified one week before a committee that was very concerned about why the
IRS was not collecting every last dollar and, at least two members told me they
wanted-they expected-every last dollar that was owed to be collected. And the
next week, I appeared before a different committee in which a number of
members, and particularly one I’ll never forget, expressed the view: “what’s a
couple of billion dollars worth of fraud? You should be much less concerned
about collecting money and more concerned about providing better taxpayer
service.” Clearly, a very schizophrenic approach to what we should be doing.

The 1998 IRS Reform Act mandated that the IRS fundamentally adjust its mode
of operations. The overall effect of these changes (either positive, negative, or neither)
can be modeled within the context of a tax system changing to NPM methodology. The
effects of 1998 IRS Reform Act are thus empirical questions.
1.3 Reallocation of IRS Resources
The IRS’s mode of operations was fundamentally changed as a result of the 1998
IRS Reform Act. In 1997, the IRS audited a total of 1.7 million individual and corporate
returns, and in 2002, the total dropped over 50 percent to 827,000 (an even more dramatic
decline occurred if one looks at 2000 compared to 1997).

In other words, the

enforcement of the IRC was fundamentally altered as reflected in Table 1.
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Fiscal
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Table 1
IRS Enforcement Activity
Audit
Audits
Technical Staff
1,728,122
16,657
1,362,643
15,760
1,228,406
14,991
715,915
14,252
815,057
13,018
826,979
12,388

Full Time
Employees
101,703
98,036
98,729
97,074
97,707
99,901

This table reflects a year by year analysis of the number of IRS audits and IRS personnel
staffing. While total full time employees have remained relatively constant, the number of
audits and the number of full time auditors have declined materially since 1997. The source of
this data was the JCT’s 2003 (7, 39 and 43) data request.

Congressional supervision, IRS’s internal management, electronic filing, and taxpayers’
rights were all legislatively affected.
Tax administration within the U.S. is a massive undertaking. The sheer scope and
size of IRS operations is reflected in Table 2.
Table 2
Quantifying IRS Scope of Operations
2003 Projections
Total returns
Individual returns
Individual refunds
Direct Deposit of refund
Simultaneous e-filing of federal & state returns
Taxpayers who utilized automated telephone service
Taxpayers who utilized walk-in assistance

Numbers
(in millions)
175
132 (75%)
104
30
18
27
4.53

This table shows the enormity of IRS operations. The source of this data is the JCT (2003, 5 and
6) data request.

The JCT’s 2000 Annual Review observed that “face-to-face audits” were down
40 percent since 1998. It observed that “the IRS attributes this decline to continued
decline in staff due to budget constraints and a substantial increase in the amount of time
required per case due to provisions in the IRS Reform Act” (JCT 2000, 9). From 1998 to
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2002, average time spent on an individual return audit increased from 22 hours to 28.4;
for larger corporations, the time increased from 140 hours to 232 hours. Combined, these
measures indicate decreasing enforcement coupled with growing complexity (JCT 2003,
106).
The 1998 IRS Reform Act mandates that the IRS fundamentally adjust its mode
of operation. It is hypothesized that the IRS’s reaction was to back off the resources
devoted to compliance activities. Those resources were diverted to taxpayer services and
to overall yearly tax management (advance payments in the 2002 and 2003 Tax Acts).
Table 3 highlights the decrease in direct audit staff between 1997 and 2000.
Table 3
Audit Technical Staff
Audit Technical Staff
1997
2002
Revenue agents
13,647 11,176
Tax compliance officers
2,113 1,212

% Decline
18%
43%

This table focuses on the decline of key IRS audit personnel since the 1998 IRS Reform Act.
The source of this data is the JCT (2003, 7) data request

A confounding factor is that from 1998 to 2003, Congress has passed nearly 300 code
provisions. These constant changes have necessitated over 400 modifications to forms
and instructions. The current system of taxation has resulted in 127 various individual
tax forms (JCT 2003, 6 and 8).
The JCT noted that former IRS Commissioner Rossotti observed the declines in
the following basic enforcement activities from 1992 to 2001 (JCT 2003, 5 direct quotes):
1. Document matching decreased from 33.1 percent of cases to 9.1
percent;
2. Correspondence exams (not including the earned income credit)
decreased from 4 to 1.2 percent;
3. In-person exams of individuals fell from 5.8 percent to 1.5 percent;
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4. Exams of pass-through entities decreased from 5.1 percent to 2.9
percent.
Indicative of these trends is the fact that currently 60 percent of all identified tax
deficiencies are not pursued. Nearly 80 percent of non-filers, abusive shelters, and
matches of “under-reporters” are not pursued (JCT 2003, 35).
Audit rate percentages have declined in nearly all major areas of audit
enforcement. In 1992, individual returns were audited .92 percent of the time compared
to .57 percent in 2002. Large corporate audit closures fell from 12,972 in 1992 to 8,443
in 2002 (an over 30 percent decline).

The JCT (2003, 10) observed that a major

contributor to this decrease was the erosion in assigned enforcement personnel that was
“attributed to an increased workload and unbudgeted costs.”
In July 2003, the IRS once again announced the delay of the implementation of its
massive computer upgrade; in 1995, the IRS essentially abandoned a previous $4 billion
attempt (Dooren and McWilliams 2003). This situation has been an area of chronic GAO
audit concern. The IRS’s main taxpayer records are still based on tape-driven technology
from the 1960s and 1970s. The JCT in 2003 stated (JCT 2003, 55):
One significant example, the Customer Account Data Engine will transfer
individual filers from the 1960’s magnetic tape-based system for recording
taxpayer information to a modern database, and will create applications for daily
posting of taxpayer tax account and return data.

The effects of these resource reallocations and potential deficiencies are of
fundamental importance for this dissertation. Important relevant questions are:


Did the reallocation mandated in the 1998 IRS Reform Act improve taxpayer
perceptions of the IRS?

•

Were enforcement collections affected?

•

What was the effect on IRS personnel?
11

CHAPTER 2. NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (NPM)
Within the paradigm of public administration, researchers can apply managerial,
political, or legal theories to examine government operations. Within the managerial
perspective, there are two subsets: 1) the traditional (orthodox) approach and 2) the
reform approach (NPM). Starting in the 1980s, NPM was advocated as a means to
achieve greater governmental responsiveness to public demands.

Under NPM,

governmental agencies seek to become effective and responsive to constituents.

In

contrast, under traditional management, individuals are treated impersonally and the
bureaucracy takes a rational (cost-benefit) mentality in serving the public. Appendix II
highlights differences between these two managerial approaches to public administration.
Public administration in the United States (U.S.) traces its roots to President
Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) seminal work, “The Study of Administration.” In this work,
Wilson called for a science of administration to occur with the “utmost possible
efficiency.” This bureaucratic orientation of government is based on the work of Max
Weber and Frederick Taylor. While centered on economy, efficiency and effectiveness,
traditional management comes at the cost of impersonal rules.

Structure and strict

adherence to rules are central tenets under the theory of traditional public administration.
Movement towards NPM in the 1980s was motivated by public demands for
improvement in the performance of the public sector. Public anger was directly focused
toward systems of taxation (an often cited initial example is the 1978 voter-initiated
California Proposition 13 property tax revolt).
Bagby and Franke (2001) observed that NPM views the science of “public
administration” more as “public management.” Often, an “attitude of customer service”
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is seen as an appeal of this “liberation management model.” Relative to the IRS, Bagby
and Franke (2001, 626) specifically observed:
At the IRS, accessibility and accountability encompassed in a new “customer
friendly” feel have replaced the bureaucracy’s previously remote and
authoritative style.

The reform within the IRS was cited as coming from Former Vice President Al Gore’s
“National Performance Review” (NPR). This NPR was “the Clinton administration’s
manifestation of the NPM approach” as described by Osborne and Gaebler (1992).
Bagby and Franke (2001) observed that while NPM calls for a difference in management,
the real issue is whether NPM makes for a better functioning governmental agency.
(Importantly, the degree to which the IRS did or did not accomplish this legislative
mandate utilizing the NPM orientation is a central motivation of this dissertation.)
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) observed that governance involves a “complex set
of interactions” and “complex value conflicts.” They advocate viewing the general
public as citizens, not as customers. They contend that while NPM is the “dominant
paradigm,” it needs to have a broader and longer-term perspective. Frederickson (1996)
argued that NPM was the work of “scholars, theorists, and researchers” and a potential
risk was the decreased ability to “implement policy.” Hatry (1999) observed that results
and efficiency were key attributes of agency performance under NPM. Wise (2002, 556)
observed that three competing drivers within NPM are:
•

Social equity (fair treatment),

•

Democratization (engaging citizens in bureaucracy), and

•

Humanization (employee focus).

13

These areas broadly parallel the three goals (service, enforcement, and IRS work
environment) that the IRS adopted to implement the mandates of the 1998 IRS Reform
Act. Importantly, Wise observed that an NPM paradigm could be utilized in assessing
administrative reform initiatives.
From an accounting political perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1979) observed
the effect of high information costs, heterogeneity of interests, and how organizational
costs affect the “equilibrium outcome.” The appearance of solving a problem is part of
the political process.

Economic theories apply to proposed regulations, as well as

existing regulations. Government action (or lack thereof) is part of an “asymmetric loss
function” occurring due to high information costs.
Within the boundaries of the total federal budgetary process, Rosenbloom and
Kravchuk (2002, 332) observed:
Whatever course is taken in the future, however, one thing is certain –
budgeting will remain an area of controversy for public administrators, elected
officials, political executives, interest groups, commercial interests, and the
public at large. The way in which budgetary questions are framed has a great
deal to do with the outcome of contests for public dollars.
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CHAPTER 3. TAX POLICY LITERATURE
The focus of this research project is the internal administration of U.S. tax policy
centered on the 1998 IRS Reform Act. Crumbley (1973) observed that the behavioral
aspects of taxation are typically disregarded in the passage of tax laws, although their
implications for tax policy are significant in terms of keeping “social and economic
systems under reasonable control.”

The following objectives of U.S. tax policy were

recognized by Crumbley (1973, 759 direct quotes):
1. Raising revenue
2. Encouraging growth
3. Stabilizing the economy
4. Redistributing income and wealth
5. Preaching morality
6. Fulfilling morality
Crumbley observed that accountants were ideally situated to conduct cost/benefit
assessments of tax policy. Crumbley (1973, 760) noted:
The accounting profession is in a strategic position to undertake such analyses.
But so far, accountants have been left at the starting gate by economists (and to
some extent by the finance discipline) with respect to research on the behavioral
aspect of tax laws.
The potential erosion of tax principles based on substance over form and business
purpose needs full and critical examination.

Importantly, within the area of tax

avoidance,5 some of society’s most talented individuals are engaged in attempting to
obtain tax privileges. Accountants are ideally suited to the task of analyzing tax policy.

5

Tax avoidance is the legal avoidance of taxation, as opposed to tax evasion, which is illegal. Almost all
major accounting firms have had suspect tax shelters exposed in 2002/2003. For example, KPMG’s capital
gains shelter highlights that the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is not always
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Drawing upon Crumbley’s (1973) call for accounting research in the behavioral
implications of tax policy, Porcano (1984) evaluated tax policy through an experiment
utilizing business school faculty and graduate business students. Porcano observed the
importance of “distributive justice” (fairness). The study indicated a need for a balance
of competing goals, and a regrettable facet of taxation is that it is “discriminatory by
nature.” If taxpayers do not perceive horizontal or vertical equity,6 then they potentially
react through “tax evasion.” As the late Senator Russell B. Long7 succinctly stated,
“Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that other fella behind the tree.”
Within a context of public choice models, Poterba (1998, 396) examined the
relative lack of direct tax policy research in the area of tax reform, and he stated there is a
need for “explaining why major tax reforms occur, why they occur when they occur, and
why they take the forms that they do.” Through a study of actual tax policy reforms,
Birnbaum (1998) observed that while fundamental tax reform receives vocal support, the
reality is that major reforms rarely occur (i.e., vocal support for reform is often no more
than political rhetoric). The effects of California’s Proposition 13 tax policy initiative
and other states’ subsequent property tax reforms are subjects of numerous empirical
examinations on pre- and post- enactment bases (see, for example, McGuire, 1999 and
Sexton, Sheffrin, and O’Sullivan, 1999).

dichotomous. Despite internal objections, KPMG decided not to register the tax shelter due to a
cost/benefit assessment, a revenue culture, and a lax regulatory climate (Bryan-Low 2003). Even Myron S.
Scholes (Nobel Prize winner in Economics and co-author of the seminal Taxes and Business Strategy), in
governmental questioning over his investment in Long-Term Capital Management’s tax schemes, declared,
“I’m being trapped here” in regards to the contention of “no business purpose.” (Johnston 2003).
6
Under horizontal equity, taxpayers with similar incomes pay similar taxes; under vertical equity,
taxpayers with higher incomes pay higher percentages of taxes.
7
Former Senator Long served from 1948 to 1986. Fifteen of those years he was the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee. He was considered such a master of tax legislation that Wall Street considered
him the “fourth branch of government” (Donlan 2003).
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Within this broad framework, Richardson and Hildreth (1998) observed that
taxation is a “political process,” but an economic framework can be used to assess a tax
structure.

They recognized the five central attributes of a viable tax structure as

having/being “reliable, predictable growth of revenue,” “broad base and low rates” (were
the goals of the 1986 Tax Reform Act), “economic development and growth,” “equitable
and fair,” and “tax simplicity.”
In a commentary, Shevlin (1999) observed that the three main areas of tax
research are tax policy, tax planning, and tax compliance. Tax planning is the main focus
of empirical accounting research and often involves a corporate focal point. Shevlin
described tax policy as more descriptive within the “spirit of the positive approach.” He
observed that tax policy research could potentially have the greatest effect from a social
standpoint. However, this dichotomy is incomplete. Tax policy can be and is examined
from an empirical perspective.
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), in an extensive summation of accounting
empirical income tax research, stated that corporate tax shelter schemes have taken
“aggressive interpretations of the tax law,” and they observed the decline in corporations’
share of the percentage of total tax paid. They called for tax policy empirical research
into this apparent phenomenon.
Utilizing a three stage empirical model (complexity → unfairness→ evasion),
Forest and Sheffrin (2002) examined the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey from an
economic perspective to gauge the effect that tax simplification would have on
compliance [the article counters the Michael Graetz (1997) call for simplifying taxation].
An outside consulting firm administered the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey
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nationwide. Nearly 1,800 taxpayers were interviewed (resulting in 1,194 usable surveys).
The survey lasted approximately 30 minutes and had two versions (80% of the questions
were identical in the two surveys). Forest and Sheffrin contend that the critical attribute
for compliance was found to be the perception of fairness, not the effect of complexity
per se. From an NPM paradigm, highly relevant parts of the article were that findings
from the survey included (Forest and Sheffrin, 2002, 80 and 82):


Taxpayers in 1990 perceived the chance of an audit at a relatively high 15
percent.



Taxpayers sought outside help 52 percent of the time.

This survey has been obtained from the National Archives, and questions with an “NPMrelated” focus were re-asked of taxpayers to gauge their perceptions.
Through an examination of state and local revenue streams, Tannenwald (2002)
observed that from a public finance perspective there is an awareness of a potential
decline in the overall systems of taxation on the state and local level. He called for the
evaluations of long-term trends in tax policy administration, which are directly relevant
to the federal level. In a study centered on the effect of a single tax act, Mackie (2002)
assessed the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act8 in terms of capital income taxation
through effective tax rate analysis. He observed the “complexity involved in tax policy
analysis” and focused on the implications of tax policy changes occurring in one year.
Tax policy was analyzed by Harmelink and VanDenburgh (2002) through
utilization of General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, Treasury Inspector General of
Tax Administration (TIGTA) reports, and an internal IRS study. An internal IRS study,
obtained under a Freedom of Information request, showed that “only 19% of tax law
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questions were answered correctly” by the IRS in 2000/2001.9 In contrast, Hite (2002)
utilized an IRS conducted survey to document an audit process system with an 85 percent
positive rating among audited taxpayers in 1998. It is important to note that the survey
that Hite used was limited to a sample of taxpayers audited by the IRS in 1998 and was
directly administered by the IRS. In contrast, the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey
was a nationwide survey of randomly selected taxpayers and was conducted/administered
by an outside consultant. Hite concluded that “negative reports – should be weighed
cautiously against these positive reports.”

The directly conflicting Hite and

Harmelink/VanDenburgh studies were cross-sectional in nature.
Extending this literature stream that focuses on the IRS’s administration,
Harmelink, Porcano, and VanDenburgh (2003) utilized GAO reports on the IRS for the
calendar year 2002 and documented a tax system with potentially chronic problems. The
GAO appeared to present the ongoing modernization efforts in a favorable light, but the
details contained within the reports indicated otherwise.
In summary, the limited available research indicates that tax administration is a
complicated endeavor involving conflicting trade-offs. Various methodologies have been
utilized in examining the effect of tax policy changes. An assessment of the 1998 IRS
Reform Act from an accounting and public administration tax policy perspective adds to
this sparse literature stream and to the understanding of tax administration. The 1998
IRS Reform Act was a unique event in that the IRS’s methodology to taxation was
altered for the first time since 1952.

Importantly, the prior literature called for or

8

The 1986 tax reform did not center on IRS administration changes, but was meant to simplify the U.S. tax
code (the goal was for a “broad base and low rates”).
9
Later, a 2003 TIGTA audit found that the IRS incorrectly prepared tax returns 83 percent of the time
when anonymous TIGTA auditors had returns prepared at Taxpayer Assistance Centers.
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highlighted the need for the examination of tax policy reforms. This dissertation assesses
the implications of legislatively mandated changes to U.S. Tax Administration (radically
transitioned from traditional management to NPM).
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN: HYPOTHESES AND TESTING
This research project assesses whether the IRS has been successful in moving
towards accomplishing the legislative mandate of the 1998 IRS Reform Act (i.e., “a wellrun IRS”).

This research contributes to the examination of U.S. tax policy and

administration by partitioning IRS administration outcomes into pre- and post- enactment
of the 1998 IRS Reform Act. As the GAO observed in May 2003 (GAO 2003, 1):
Congress established the National Commission on Restructuring IRS in 1995
and passed the Restructuring Act in 1998, which increased Congress’s oversight
of the agency. In passing the Act, Congress set two basic goals for IRS:
improve service to taxpayers while continuing to enforce compliance with the
tax laws.

Importantly, the consequences of the 1998 IRS Reform Act now can be measured and the
progress towards an NPM approach can be assessed.
Partial replication of the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey combined with
analyses of the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates of individual “tax misreporting,”
the JCT’s annual assessments of the 1998 IRS Reform Act, and supplemental IRS data
provided the foundation for empirically testing the following hypotheses. Survey results
and analyses of tax compliance and IRS personnel data were utilized to test the effects of
an NPM approach on U.S. tax administration. This approach is in contrast to prior
studies that utilized data in cross-sectional designs, survey-only, and anecdotal evidence.
Initial employment of univariate statistics identifies underlying patterns. This study was
supplemented with multivariate analyses (modeled using the available data).
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4.1 Taxpayer Service
A driving motivation behind the 1998 IRS Reform Act was the perception that the
IRS’s treatment of taxpayers was “evil.”10

This perception resulted in an NPM

orientation being legislatively mandated. Specifically, §1002 of the Act reads:
§1002. Internal Revenue Service Mission To Focus On Taxpayers’ Needs.
The Internal Revenue Service shall review and restate its mission to place a greater
emphasis on serving the public and meeting taxpayers’ needs.

Taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS are thus a major outcome variable of interest from the
1998 IRS Reform Act. In assessing potential changes in taxpayers’ perceptions of the
IRS, the following hypothesis was tested.
H1: There is no change in taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS since the 1998 IRS
Reform Act.
This hypothesis was tested by re-asking selected questions from the IRS’s 1990
Taxpayer Opinion Survey (a nationwide survey).11 The IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion
Survey, data set, and written report have been obtained from the National Archives and
Records Administration. The goal of the survey was “to gauge the public’s mood after
the 1986 Tax Reform Act and to gather trend data on issues of concern to the IRS.”
Questions with an NPM-related focus were re-asked of taxpayers to determine potential
differences in responses from 1990. Additionally, four independent questions were asked
centering on the overall fairness of the tax system, use of outside help, perceived audit
potential, and type of tax form filed.

10

Supra note 1.
This survey elicited taxpayers’ views on the IRS and U.S. Tax Administration from September through
November of 1990 (Schulman 1991). It employed “Refusal Conversion Letters” to encourage a high
response rate (response rate of 63 percent was achieved). Sample units were drawn based on housing units
utilizing a cluster design.

11
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Several questions were re-asked to allow for an assessment of differences
between the 1990 responses and the 2004 responses. A major goal of the 1998 IRS
Reform Act was to favorably change taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS’s level of
taxpayer service, while maintaining compliance. In fact, the IRS’s first stated goal is to
provide “top quality service to all taxpayers.”
Differences or no differences in response patterns indicate the degree to which
reforms were or were not successful, as well as indicate if any unintended consequences
occurred. A two-tail t-test for differences between two sample responses was conducted
based on each individual sample question (method of compared comparison).
n

t = ∑ (x1– x2) / s/n1/2
i=1

It is assumed that the two populations of taxpayers are approximately normally
distributed.
Any response differences based on Louisiana filers (62 percent of those surveyed)
versus other state filers, date of survey (April 15 versus later), and tax forms filed were
analyzed for any potential biases.

The information on which tax forms were filed

approximately segments taxpayers based on their income12 and reporting characteristics.
Lower and upper income taxpayers were selectively targeted by altering survey
locations. Besides broadly classifying taxpayers by income information on which tax
form was utilized provides insight to taxpayers’ income and deductions. To file 1040EZ, a taxpayer must (instructions for 1040-EZ):


Not have income over $50,000



File single or jointly (not head of household or married filing separately)
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Not claim exemptions



Only have wages, taxable scholarships/grants, unemployment compensation
or Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends



Have under $1,500 in interest income



Not have advance earned income credit payments (EIC)



Not have deductions or credits (other (EIC)

To file 1040-A, taxpayers must have under $50,000 in income and can report limited
sources of income. Additionally, only certain income items can be reported. Credits and
adjustments are also limited.

Further, one cannot itemize; thus, the home interest

deduction cannot be taken, among others items. Differences in responses among the
different tax filers were analyzed for any potential changes.
A short introduction explaining the purpose (PhD Dissertation) and subject (tax
policy) of the survey was utilized to initiate the survey process. A high voluntary
participation rate was easily obtained.

See Appendix III for the actual survey

instrument.13
4.2 Taxpayer Compliance
In conjunction with improving taxpayer service, the 1998 IRS Reform Act
required that the IRS maintain taxpayers’ compliance with the IRC. When the 1998 IRS
Reform Act was passed, Congress believed that voluntary compliance would be enhanced
when “public confidence” in the federal system of taxation was “restored” (JCT 1998,
19). In May 2003, the GAO observed, in mandated Congressional testimony, that the
second major goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was for the IRS to maintain compliance

12
13

In 2003, a taxpayer had to have under $50,000 in income to utilize either the 1040EZ or 1040A.
Optimal sample size calculations indicated a sample size of 168 surveys.
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(GAO 2003, 1).14 The second hypothesis addresses this aspect of the 1998 IRS Reform
Act:
H2: There is no change in taxpayers’ compliance since the 1998 IRS Reform Act.

Internal IRS data (pre- and post- 1998) was utilized to test for changes in the
IRS’s compliance posture. The proxy for taxpayers’ tax compliance is the Bureau of
Economic Analysis - Adjusted Gross Income Gap (BEA-AGIG, 1958-2002). The BEA
compares its annual estimate of personal income to the income actually reported to the
IRS to estimate the tax reporting gap (Park 2003, Ledbetter 2004A, and 2004B). A series
of modifications are made by the BEA to both their income estimate and to the AGI
reported by the IRS to obtain comparability.
The use of data contained in the Congressionally mandated annual JCT studies of
the 1998 IRS Reform Act, in conjunction with the Bureau of Economic Analysis’
estimates of the AGI-Gap allowed for testing for any potential effects the 1998 IRS
Reform Act had on compliance. In April 2003, the JCT (2003, 69) requested that the
Acting IRS Commissioner furnish information for the “Joint Review of the IRS Strategic
Plans and Budget” as required under §8022(f)(3) of the IRC. This information centered
on key internal measures of the IRS’s enforcement posture.
An exploratory multivariate linear regression model examined the IRS’s
enforcement posture pre- and post- 1998.

The model consists of 6 independent

variables15 drawn from variables identified in the JCT’s 2003 study of the 1998 IRS
Reform Act:

14

The “fifth and final” joint congressional review of this Act occurred in 2003. (GAO 2003, 1).
This data was obtained from the JCT studies (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) of the 1998 IRS
Reform Act along with supplemental internal IRS data and Syracuse University’s Transactional Record

15
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GAP = ßo + ß1ADT+ ß2LIT + ß3 HRS + ß4CHG + ß5R98 + ß6A86 + ß7A90 + e
Where:
GAP = BEA calculation of the yearly annual tax gap (expressed in terms of the
percentage of total revenue);
ADT = the number of IRS audit personnel;
LIT = the number of returns the IRS successfully litigates;
HRS = the average number of hours an IRS auditor spends auditing a return;
CHG = the number of returns with changes after the IRS completes an audit;
R98 = a dummy variable for the 1998 IRS Reform Act (1 if 1998 or beyond, 0
otherwise)
A86 = the 1986 Tax Act control variable for tax complexity/changes;
A90 = the 1990 Tax Act control variable for tax complexity/changes; and
e = a normally distributed error term.

The dependent variable (gap) is based on the BEA calculation of the yearly
annual tax gap. The annual tax gap estimates are quantified in terms of the percentage of
AGI-GAP (BEA-AGI minus IRS AGI) over total AGI as derived by the BEA.
Expressing the AGI-Gap as a percentage controls for inflationary effects. The tax income
gap is estimated on an annual basis back to 1958. A central question/issue of this
dissertation is the effect, if any, the 1998 IRS Reform Act had on “tax-return
misreporting.”
Based on the language contained in the JCT’s data request, certain independent
variable signs can be predicted. Further, after the well-publicized 1998 IRS Reform Act,

Access Clearinghouse data. Models that incorporate lag variables were utilized as sensitivity tests to verify
potential results. The Tax-Changes variable is incorporated into later models and is actually two separate
Tax Acts.
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a new perception on audit risk was likely created. Prior to 1998, taxpayers’ perceptions
of their overall audit potential, as the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey indicated,
were higher than their actual audit potential (15 percent versus less than 5 percent actual
overall).
The first independent variable (ADT) is the number of IRS audit personnel. It is
predicted to be negatively related to the annual tax gap. An increase in the number of
audit personnel is expected to decrease the tax gap; conversely, a decrease in audit
personnel is expected to increase the tax gap.

The second independent variable (LIT)

represents the number of returns the IRS litigates (disputes that the IRS initiates). A
negative relationship is expected with the tax gap, as less IRS-initiated litigation results in
an expected increase in the tax gap.
The third independent variable (HRS) represents the number of hours spent
auditing a return. It is expected that the more hours needed to audit a return will increase
the tax gap, as IRS personnel will be less productive in terms of the total number of
audits completed due to greater taxpayer protection procedures (check lists, supervisory
reviews, and overall greater sensitivity to taxpayers’ issues after the 1998 IRS Reform
Act). The fourth independent variable is the number of returns that have changes after an
IRS audit (CHG). CHG represents the number of audits the IRS completes where there
are changes in taxes due. It is predicted to be negatively related to the tax gap. This
variable is a proxy for the IRS’s audit aggressiveness.
The effect of the 1998 IRS Reform Act (R98), the key variable of interest, is
assessed with a dummy variable (1 if 1998 or beyond, 0 otherwise).16 While the prior
16

The model was also calculated by alternating the year of the 1998 IRS Reform Act variable (1997 or
1998).
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independent variables reflect changes resulting from the 1998 IRS Reform Act, their
effect will only decrease the likelihood of finding a statistically significant relationship.
If a positive relationship is detected, it may indicate that one of the unintended
consequences of moving from a traditional management focus to an NPM focus is a
decline in tax compliance.
The number of tax law changes (Tax-Changes) in a given year are expected to
proxy for the growing tax complexity and is a control variable. The major tax reform acts
of 1986 and 1990 are utilized as proxies for any potential effect tax complexity/change
has on the above model.

Smith, Harmelink and Hasselback, in a listing of Tax Acts

since 1913, observed the following about these Acts (1-17 and 1-18):
The Tax Reform Act of 1986: The IRC was re-titled the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986. This tax act was the single most comprehensive and complex change
in the history of U.S. taxation.
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990: Many significant changes including the
establishment of a three-rate structure of 15 percent, 28 percent and 31 percent.
A preferential capital gains rate of 28 percent was instituted.
The 1986 Tax Act legislated a systematic change in tax policy (broad base and low rates).
While many Code sections were simplified, many complex provisions such as passive
activity loss rules and private activity bond rules came into existence for the first time.
The 1990 Act began the initial undoing of many of the 1986 changes. In 1988, the JCT
(1998, 142) observed that Congress was aware that growing complexity strains the IRS’s
and taxpayers’ abilities to comply.
The model is run in various forms due to data restrictions (data for audit hours
and change-returns is available only back to 1992) and to control for possible serial
correlation. When utilizing time series data sets, serial correlation is often present. If
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serial correlation is present, the assumption of independent error terms (i.e., residuals are
correlated with their lag values) is violated, and an unadjusted regression model is an
inappropriate model specification. To test for the presence of serial correlation, DurbinWatson test statistics were calculated.17 When serial correlation is present, the first
difference technique is used to alleviate the problem.
4.3 IRS’s Personnel Environment
The third hypothesis addresses the degrees to which the IRS has made changes to
the working environment within the IRS (as called for in “Subtitle C-Personnel
Flexibilities” of the 1998 IRS Reform Act). The JCT’s 2003 annual review requested
data on the IRS’s executive compensation and employee termination. The following
hypothesis was tested.
H3: There is no change in the IRS’s employee work environment since the 1998
IRS Reform Act.
Examination of the information furnished as to the effect of §1201 (IRS executive
compensation) and §1203 (IRS employee termination) was utilized in testing this
hypothesis. Questions were specifically asked about the authority granted to the IRS to
better compete for top executives under “streamlined critical pay authority.” Under
§1201, “Improvements In Personnel Flexibilities,”
The Secretary of the Treasury may, for a period of 10 years after the date of
enactment of this section, establish, fix the compensation of, and appoint
individuals to designated critical administrative, technical, and professional
positions needed to carry out the functions of the Internal Revenue Service.

These “critical pay positions” were created in the 1998 IRS Reform Act to allow for
greater compensation than authorized under the civil service system. A comparison of
17

A Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic greater than 2.5 or less than 1.5 would generally indicate serial
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the compensation of recently hired IRS executives to their most recent salaries was
conducted to partially test hypothesis three.18 A two-tailed t-test for differences between
IRS and private salaries was calculated to determine whether the differences were
significant.
Questions were asked concerning the ten conditions under which an IRS
employee could be dismissed, established under the 1998 IRS Reform Act (and several
prior Acts). These conditions dealt with seizure procedures, providing false information,
violation of constitutional and civil rights, altering documentation, abusing a taxpayer,
lack of adherence to formal policy, misleading congressional inquires, failure to file a
proper return, intentionally understating a tax liability, and threatening a taxpayer. This
section was enacted, in large part, as a direct result of Congressional hearings that
centered on public outrage over the irony of IRS employees pursuing non-filers when
certain IRS employees themselves were, in fact, not filing.

Employee personnel

termination decisions under this Act were examined to determine the overall effect. In
2003, the IRS asked Congress to rescind certain aspects of this code section in its 2003
budget request because it contended it caused more administrative problems than it was
worth. However, in 2004, the IRS, when confronted with an employee filing scandal,
apparently had second thoughts.
The Congressional intent of this termination provision is indicated in that only the
Commissioner can override termination for violations (non-delegable). As the 1998 IRS
Reform Act states ((§1203(C)(2) and (3)):

correlation. A DW statistic of 2.0 indicates no serial correlation.
18
The Congressional reviews of the 1998 IRS Reform Act collected data on IRS executives’ prior salaries
and their current IRS salaries. For example, IRS executives hired in 2002 had their immediate prior
salaries compared to their new IRS salaries.
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The exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall be at the sole discretion of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and may not be delegated to any other
officer. … Any determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under
this subsection may not be appealed in any administrative or judicial proceeding.
Section §1203 of the 1998 IRS Reform Act is often referred to as the “10 deadly sins”
because it called for the termination of IRS employees if they are violated.

Both

personnel termination and executive compensation changes were major administrative
provisions of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.
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CHAPTER 5. DATA, RESULTS, AND INITIAL IMPLICATIONS
Sections 5.1 (Taxpayer Service), 5.2 (Taxpayer Compliance), and 5.3, (IRS
Personnel Environment) use various research methodologies to assess the effect of the
1998 IRS Reform Act. Taxpayer service is assessed with a partial replication of a 1990
Taxpayer Opinion Survey. Taxpayer compliance is analyzed by regressing the BEA-AGI
gap on key enforcement measures as identified by the JCT.

The IRS personnel

environment is examined by comparing IRS executive salaries to their prior private sector
pay and legislatively mandated employee terminations. Initial implications of the data
results are contained within each section and then an overall comprehensive implication
chapter follows.
5.1 Taxpayer Service
The first hypothesis predicts no change in taxpayer perceptions of the IRS
resulting from the 1998 IRS Reform Act. NPM-related questions were selected from the
IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey and re-asked of taxpayers to determine if there
were any differences in responses.19

Additionally, several questions were asked to

determine whether taxpayers surveyed in 1990 and 2004 were comparable.

Four

independent questions on general taxation issues were also asked. The results of the
2004 survey were then compared to 1990 survey results. The results of comparing the
surveys were then analyzed in the context of NPM. The 2004 survey responses were then
partitioned based on state of residence, date of filing, and type of form filed to determine
any potential biases in survey results (generally, there were none).
Taxpayers surveyed in 1990 and 2004 were statistically measured on the use of a
third party to help in preparing returns (almost identical results). Similar results were
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also obtained with the type of tax form filed and taxpayers’ perceived audit potential.
These similarities indicate comparable taxpayers were surveyed in both 1990 and 2004.
In 1990 and 2004, taxpayers were asked whether they sought help in filing tax forms in
the last couple of years. The question was:
During the past few years, how often have you completed your tax forms
yourself, instead of getting help from someone else? Would you say you always
do them yourself, usually do, sometimes do, or never do them yourself?

The U-shaped frequency distribution of responses is nearly identical for the 1990 and
2004 surveys as shown in Figure 1 (which is an indication that similar taxpayers were
surveyed in 1990 and 2004).
60%
50%
40%
2004

30%

1990

20%
10%
0%
always

usually

sometimes

never

Figure 1
Use of a Third Party by Taxpayers to Prepare Tax Returns
Taxpayers were asked if they had outside help in filing their tax forms. There were 239 usable
observations for this question in the 2004 survey. For three respondents, no response was
obtained.

Taxpayers in 1990 and 2004 were asked which tax form they filed. This question
enabled respondents to be broadly classified by their income (1040EZ and 1040A can
only be filed if taxpayers had under $50,000 in income in 2003).

The frequency

distribution in Figure 2 shows that a broad range of taxpayers were surveyed and that

19

Surveys were collected from a variety of locations, including U.S. post offices, airports, bus and train
terminals, offices, conferences, and school events.
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taxpayers were highly similar on tax forms filed when comparing those surveyed in 1990
and 2004.
70%
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2004

30%

1990
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1040EZ
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1040

Figure 2
Forms Filed by Taxpayers
Taxpayers were asked which tax forms they had filed (1040-EZ, 1040-A or 1040). There were
203 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey. Thirty one respondents were
unsure which tax form they filed.

The decline in 1040 filers is likely due to the “not sure” response rate of 17 percent in
2004, which is considerably higher than the 6 percent in 1990. In the 1990 survey,
taxpayers were shown blank copies of tax forms; this was not done in 2004 based on the
pilot study results (which showed that administration would not be cost-beneficial).
Overall, Figures 1 and 2 reflect that there was homogeneity in the populations
sampled and tested; thus, the results of the two surveys are comparable. The question on
use of a third party preparer and which tax form was filed enables taxpayers to be broadly
classified and they are a good indication of whether similar taxpayers were interviewed
when comparing those surveyed in 1990 to 2004.
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Taxpayers were asked, “Have you already filed a federal income tax return for
last year – that is 2003 – or are you planning to file an income tax return?” The
responses to this question are reflected in Table 4.
Table 4
Is a Taxpayer Planning to File a Return?
Valid
Filed
Frequency Percent
Yes
217 93.53%
No
15
6.47%
Taxpayers were asked if they plan to file a return. There were 232 usable observations for this
question in the 2004 survey. Twelve respondents were not sure whether or not they would file a
return.

Of taxpayers surveyed, nearly 94 percent had filed a return and 6 percent were not
planning to file (taxpayers under certain income levels are not required to file returns).
For purposes of simplicity and because all persons in the U.S. pay some taxes (for
example, sales taxes), respondents to the survey are referred to as taxpayers in the
dissertation, regardless of their intent to file a tax return for tax year 2003.
Taxpayers were asked a set of questions directly centering on the IRS. These
questions dealt specifically with NPM-related issues (a central focus of this dissertation).
These questions were re-asked and scaled in exactly the same manner and order as they
were asked in the 1990 IRS Taxpayer Opinion Survey. When taxpayers were asked the
questions, they could respond based upon the following 6 point scale:


1 strongly agree



2 agree



3 somewhat agree



4 somewhat disagree



5 disagree
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6 strongly disagree
7 not sure (in the following figures, this category is not reflected; the
number of usable observations, however, is reflected below the figures)

Thus, the lower the score, the better the IRS is perceived by those surveyed (this is the
exact methodology that was in the original IRS 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey). The
higher the score, the less favorable opinion the taxpayer has of the IRS.
Table 5 reflects the mean scores of the respondents and compares the 2004
responses to the 1990 responses.
Table 5
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Survey Questions
2004
Mean
Score,
(Standard
Deviation,
and n)
3.38
1.486
204

1990
Mean
Score,
(Standard
Deviation,
and n)
3.50
1.647
854

2. I am confident that the IRS
would never try to take more
money from me than they
should.

3.83
1.511
232

3. You can depend on the IRS
to keep accurate tax records.

NPM-Related
Survey Questions

Mean
Difference
-0.12

t-stat. and
P-Value
-1.040
0.2986

3.40
1.739
881

0.43

3.716
0.0002

3.49
1.424
234

3.34
1.684
863

0.15

1.345
0.1789

4. When it comes to
investigating
their
own
people, the IRS is as thorough
as they are with everyone else.

3.80
1.489
185

3.07
1.620
810

0.73

5.875
0.0001
(less than)

5. Employees who work for
the IRS display a high degree
of honesty and integrity.

3.28
1.339
205

3.13
1.396
827

0.15

1. IRS employees are just as
knowledgeable as any private
tax expert.

1.452
0.1468

Direction
of
Change
Not Significant

Worse

Not Significant

Worse

Not Significant

Table Continued
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6. IRS procedures and
0.07
0.668
Not Significant
3.53
3.46
practices
are
fair
and
1.445
1.521
0.5043
reasonable ones that respect
225
863
the rights of taxpayers.
This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree). The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

The IRS was perceived as performing significantly worse in the areas of correctly
assessing taxpayers’ obligations (“take more money”) and “investigating their own
people” (both P-values under .001 ) Overall, Table 5 reflects that taxpayers’ perceptions
of the IRS have not improved in four NPM-related areas and in two NPM-related areas
the IRS scored statistically worse. Failure to find any improvement in conjunction with
two significant evaluations (P-values under .001) of perceived decreases in taxpayer
service strongly implies that there has been no improvement and perhaps an overall
decline.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the frequency distribution of responses from 1990 to
2004 relative to the first NPM-related question (whether “IRS employees are just as
knowledgeable as any private tax expert”). Notably, taxpayers who strongly agree with
this statement declined from 15 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 2004, which indicates a
decrease in taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS from the standpoint of receiving a “top
quality” response.
The IRS in 2004 generally received more favorable evaluations on this IRS
employee knowledge question in 1990 in the other five categories (“agree” through
“strongly disagree”). The IRS had higher positive responses for “agree” and “somewhat
agree” and lower responses for “somewhat disagree,” “disagree,” and “strongly
disagree.”
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Figure 3
IRS Employees’ Knowledge
Taxpayers were asked if “IRS employees are just as knowledgeable as any private tax expert.”
There were 204 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey. Forty respondents
were unsure as to the IRS employees’ knowledge.

The second NPM-related question asked whether the subject was “confident that
the IRS would never try to take more money from me than they should.” Taxpayers
“strongly agreed” with this statement nearly 20 percent of the time in 1990. In 2004, less
than 5 percent agreed with this statement. Conversely, 20 percent of taxpayers disagreed
with the statement in 2004.

In 1990, only 11 percent disagreed.

The frequency

distribution of taxpayers’ responses is shown in Figure 4.
The third NPM-related question in this set inquired as to taxpayers’ opinion on
whether they could “depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records.” In 1990, 17
percent of those surveyed strongly agreed with this statement. In 2004, only 5 percent
strongly agreed. The IRS did receive more “agree” and “somewhat agree” evaluations in
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Figure 4
IRS and Taxpayers’ Money
Taxpayers were asked, “I am confident that the IRS would never try to take more money from
me than they should.” There were 232 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.
Twelve respondents were unsure on this point.
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Figure 5
IRS Record Keeping
Taxpayers were asked, “You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records.” There were
234 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey. Ten respondents were unsure on
this point.
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2004. The response categories “agree,” and “somewhat disagree” were similar in 1990
when compared to 2004. The frequency distribution of answers is shown in Figure 5:
The fourth NPM-related question asked, “When it comes to investigating their
own people, the IRS is as thorough as they are with everyone else.” On this question,
taxpayers graded the IRS less favorably on “strongly agree,” “agree,” and “somewhat
agree” and higher on “disagree” and “strongly disagree.” (See Figure 6.)
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Figure 6
Investigating Their Own People
Taxpayers were asked, “When it comes to investigating their own people, the IRS is as thorough
as they are with everyone else.” There were 185 usable observations for this question in the
2004 survey. Fifty-nine respondents were unsure as to this issue. This category had the highest
number of “unsure” responses.

The fifth NPM-related question in this set asked, “Employees who work for the
IRS display a high degree of honesty and integrity.” Taxpayers in 1990 strongly agreed
with this statement 12 percent of the time. In 2004, this percentage dropped nearly in
half to 6.5 percent of the time. On the other potential responses, the IRS had nearly
identical percentages in 1990 and 2004. (See Figure 7.)
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Figure 7
IRS Employees’ Honesty and Integrity
Taxpayers were asked, “Employees who work for the IRS display a high degree of honesty and
integrity.” There were 205 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey. Thirty-nine
respondents were unsure on this issue.

From the standpoint of changes mandated by the 1998 IRS Reform Act, this question and
the following question are particularly strong measures of Congressional desires in
passing the 1998 legislation.
The last NPM-related survey question asked whether “IRS procedures and
practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect the rights of taxpayers.” Once again,
taxpayers were less likely to strongly agree with this statement when comparing results
from 2004 to that of 1990. For the rest of the responses, taxpayers responded similarly
when comparing the two years (IRS tended to score slightly better in 2004). (See Figure
8.)
Table 6 reflects a consistent trend of a lower score on the “strongly agree”
response (most favorable to the IRS) for all six questions centering on NPM. This
strongly implies that taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS have decreased relative to the
IRS’s strategic goals of providing “top quality service to each taxpayer,” which was the
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first stated IRS goal after the 1998 IRS Reform Act. The reason for universal decrease is
unclear, but it is plausible that the 1998 IRS Reform Act did not increase taxpayers’
rating of the IRS most favorable response category when comparing 2004 survey results
to the 1990 IRS survey results.
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Figure 8
Fairness of IRS’s Procedures and Practices
Taxpayers were asked, “IRS procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect
the rights of taxpayers.” There were 223 usable observations for this question in the 2004
survey. Twenty-one respondents were unsure on this issue.

Table 6
Universal Decrease in Strongly Agree Responses By Taxpayers
2004
1990
Strongly Strongly
NPM-Related Questions
Agree
Agree Decrease
1. IRS employees are just as
knowledgeable as any private tax expert.
2. I am confident that the IRS would never
try to take more money from me than they
should.
3. You can depend on the IRS to keep
accurate tax records.
4. When it comes to investigating their own
people, the IRS is as thorough as they are
with everyone else.
5. Employees who work for the IRS display
a high degree of honesty and integrity.
6. IRS procedures and practices are fair and
reasonable ones that respect the rights of
taxpayers.
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8%

15%

-7%

5%

18%

-13%

5%

17%

-12%

4%

20%

-16%

7%

12%

-5%

5%

11%

-6%

The IRS’s intent to provide taxpayers with high quality service is reflected
additionally in its opening statements in the annual 1040 instructions (included since
1998 in the 1040 instructions). Specifically, IRS annually inserts the IRS mission (2003
1040 instructions, 2):
The IRS Mission: Provide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law
with integrity and fairness to all.
After the initial six questions (which focused on NPM-related issues), four broader
independent questions also were asked (also from the original 1990 survey). A question
dealt with taxpayers’ overall perceptions of the tax system. Taxpayers were asked:
How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to the 2003
tax return – do you feel it is quite fair to most people, or reasonably fair, or
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair to most people?
Here taxpayers had much more favorable views of the U.S. tax system than they
had in 1990. Almost 50 percent of taxpayers surveyed in 2004 viewed the system
favorably compared to only 35 percent in 1990. Additionally, the 2004 trend of a more
favorable view held over all categories of responses. (See Figure 9.)
60%
50%
40%
2004

30%

1990

20%
10%
0%
quite fair

reasonably fair

somewhat
unfair

quite unfair

Figure 9
Taxpayers’ Perceptions of Overall Fairness of System
Taxpayers were asked their perception on the overall fairness of the taxation system. There were
234 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.
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The JCT observed in 1998 (JCT 1998, 19):
The Congress believed that a well-run IRS is critical to the operation of our tax
system. Public confidence in the IRS must be restored so that our system of
voluntary compliance will not be compromised. The Congress believed that
most Americans are willing to pay their fair share of taxes, and that public
confidence in the IRS is key to maintaining that willingness.

Despite a general decrease in taxpayers’ favorable perceptions of the IRS, their
overall perception of the U.S. tax system improved markedly.

Evidently, factors other

than taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS affect their view of U.S. taxation, e.g., tax rates
which declined from 1990 to 2004. A stated goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was to
increase the public’s favorable perception of the overall federal taxation process and this
goal has been achieved according to those surveyed. The extent to which the 1998 IRS
Reform Act is affecting this view is debatable, based on the decline in taxpayers’
perceptions of the IRS, as reflected in the previous six questions.
An audit question was asked in the survey. The question was shortened based on
pilot testing of the original two-page survey. It was condensed to make the survey flow
better, make it clearer to those surveyed, and to format the survey on one page. The
question centered on taxpayers’ perceptions of their audit potential. In the 1990 survey
the question read:
As you may know, an audit is when you have to go to an IRS office or they
come to your house or business or they may correspond with you, and you are
asked to prove your deductions or answer questions about your tax return. The
question I have is: out of every 100 taxpayers at your income level, how many
or what percent do you think were audited last year? (Scale on percentage
basis.)
The 2004 survey question was shortened to:
An audit is when the IRS asks you to prove your deductions or answer questions
about your tax return (either in person or through the mail). Out of every 100
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taxpayers at your income level, what percent do you think were audited last
year? (Scale on percentage basis.)
In 1990, taxpayers on average perceived their audit potential at 16 percent.20 In 2004,
taxpayers perceived this potential as increasing to 18 percent. In 1990, taxpayers had
under a 5 percent chance of actually being audited; in 2003, the actual number of returns
audited had in fact decreased to less than one percent of returns filed. Table 7 shows the
frequency distribution of the perceived audit potential in 2004.
Table 7
Taxpayers’ Perceived Percentage of IRS Audits
2.5% or lower
20%
Over 2.5% to 5%
11%
Over 5% to 10%
12%
Over 10% to 20%
12%
Over 20% to 30%
22%
Over 50%
5%
Taxpayers were asked their perceived IRS audit potential. There were 199 usable observations
for this question in the 2004 survey. Forty-five respondents stated they were unsure of the audit
rate.

Taxpayers correctly perceived their audit potential at “2.5 percent or less” 20 percent of
the time. Clearly, the IRS Commissioner and the IRS enforcement division would
contend that this gross over-assessment of audit potential is highly favorable. The IRS
would likely contend it is an intended consequence of selective high profile enforcement
action. For example, the IRS routinely targets high profile enforcement action around the
annual April 15 filing deadline. Additionally, the IRS often holds press conferences
concerning new enforcement initiatives during the beginning of the year.
5.1.1 Survey Results in the Context of NPM
Senator J. Robert Kerrey and Representative Rob Portman, chief architects of the
1998 IRS Reform Act, observed that this legislation was enacted to change the public’s

20

The 1990 survey only provided the raw percentage response to this survey category.
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view of the IRS’s unfairness to taxpayers. The survey results in the current study overall
indicate that this principal goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act has not been achieved. In
two of the six NPM-related areas surveyed, the IRS performed statistically significantly
(P-values of less than .001) worse, and in no case did the IRS perform better.
Importantly, in the question that centered directly on “confidence” in the IRS, there was a
statistically significant decline (P-value of .0002).

Additionally, the IRS received

universal decreases on the “strongly agree” response across all NPM-related survey
questions. (“Strongly agree” is the most favorable response for the IRS.)
NPM requires that individuals be treated as customers, not as impersonal parts of
the process.

The IRS, in adopting the legislative mandate of an NPM orientation,

specifically incorporated as part of its radically revised mission statement that taxpayers
receive “top quality service.” Bagby and Franke (2001 at 262) observed that the IRS’s
goal was to achieve a “new customer friendly feel.” Survey results strongly indicate that
this central tenet of an NPM methodology was not achieved.

From an accounting

perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) observed that an “asymmetric loss function”
was part of the political process, and often legislation was enacted that in the end analysis
only appeared to solve the problem.

Based on this survey, this conclusion can be

reasonably asserted as occurring in the 1998 IRS Reform Act.

Thus, the IRS

implementation of an NPM methodology is unsuccessful from a taxpayer’s perspective, a
key outcome measure.
5.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The 2004 results are further analyzed based on the state of residence (Louisiana
versus non-Louisiana), date of survey (April 15 versus non April 15) and type of tax form
filed (1040EZ, 1040A and 1040). In general, the partitioned results were similar, and
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differences that were found tended to support (or strengthen) the overall implications of
the survey.
5.1.3 Partitioning Respondents by State of Residence
The state of residence of the respondents is reflected in Table 8:
Table 8
Taxpayers’ State of Residence
State
Louisiana
Texas
Tennessee
Utah
Mississippi
California
Florida
Other states

Frequency
160
16
14
10
9
9
7
16

Percent
67.23%
6.72%
5.88%
4.20%
3.78%
3.78%
2.94%
6.60%

This table shows the state of residence for taxpayers surveyed. Other states had three or fewer
observations. There were 241 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey. Three
respondents did not give their state of residence.

Of those surveyed, 67 percent resided in Louisiana; the remaining taxpayers came from a
variety of states (18 different states other than Louisiana in total). With the majority of
taxpayers residing in Louisiana a bias in the results could potentially occur. Therefore, in
order to assess any possible bias, the survey responses were recalculated based on results
from Louisiana residents versus non-Louisiana residents. Table 9 shows that the results
of the NPM-related questions were not significantly different across home states.
Taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS’s taxpayer service do not improve when splitting the
sample based on Louisiana versus other states. This result would reflect little or no bias
as a result of having a Louisiana dominated survey.
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Table 9
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by State of Residence
NPM-Related
Questions
1. IRS employees are just as
knowledgeable
as
any
private tax expert.
2. I am confident that the
IRS would never try to take
more money from me than
they should.
3. You can depend on the
IRS to keep accurate tax
records.

Louisiana

Non-Louisiana

Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

3.308
1.436
133

3.507
1.576
71

-.199

-0.886
0.3767

3.822
1.447
152
3.448
1.348
154
3.718
1.459
131

3.838
1.634
80
3.563
1.566
80
3.981
1.560
54

-.016

-0.069
0.9450

-.115

-0.553
0.5808

Mean
Difference

t-statistic
and
P-Value

4. When it comes to
-.200
-1.062
investigating
their
own
0.2896
people, the IRS is as
thorough as they are with
everyone else.
5. Employees who work for
-.171
-0.878
3.229
3.40
the IRS display a high
1.375
1.260
0.3810
degree of honesty and
140
65
integrity.
6. IRS procedures and
-.224
-1.041
3.461
3.685
practices are fair and
1.379
1.571
0.2990
reasonable ones that respect
152
73
the rights of taxpayers
This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues partitioned by taxpayers’ state
of residence. They were scaled identically on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 =
somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 = disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree). The lower
the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS. Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant
P-values are bolded.

The next four questions center on the fairness of the system, propensity to obtain
outside tax preparation assistance, audit potential, and the type of tax form filed. As
before, the results are not significantly different (as shown in Table 10). The nonLouisiana audit rate potential perception of 16.6 percent is similar to the 1990 survey
result of a perceived audit rate potential of 15.9 percent. However, none of the results
were significantly different statistically. Tables 10 and 11 strongly indicate that there is
no bias by having a majority of Louisiana residents in the survey.
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Table 10
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by State of Residence
Louisiana

Non-Louisiana

Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

Mean Score,

Independent
Mean
(Standard Deviation
Questions
Difference
and n)
1. How do you feel about the
federal income tax system as it
applies to the 2003 tax return –
do you feel it is quite fair to most
people, or reasonably fair, or
-0.089
2.561
2.65
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair
.846
.956
to most people?
155
80
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 =
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat
unfair, 4 = quite unfair)
2. During the past few years, how
often have you completed your
tax form yourself, instead of
getting help from someone else?
0.078
2.868
2.79
Would you say you always do
them yourself, usually do,
1.341
1.429
sometimes do or never do them
159
81
yourself?
(Scale: 1 = always do yourself, 2
= usually do, 3 = sometimes do,
4 = never do them yourself)
3. An audit is when the IRS asks
you to prove your deductions or
0.029
.195
.166
answer questions about your tax
return (either in person or
.202
.203
through the mail). Out of every
131
68
100 taxpayers at your income
level, what percent do you think
were audited last year?
(Scale on a percentage basis)
4. Which of the following forms
did you use the last time you
filed?
a. 1040-EZ
b. 1040-A
-0.105
3.095
3.200
c. 1040 (long form)
1.286
1.453
d. 1040 (long form, plus)
158
80
e. Don’t remember
(Scale: 1 = 1040-EZ, 2 =
1040-A, 3 = 1040)
These were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

t-statistic
and
P-value

-0.703
0.4828

0.408
0.6836

0.958
0.3392

-0.547
0.5665

other.

The non-Louisiana audit rate potential perception of 16.6 percent is similar to the 1990
survey result of a perceived audit rate potential of 15.9 percent. However, none of the
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results were significantly different statistically. Tables 10 and 11 strongly indicate that
there is no bias by having a majority of Louisiana residents in the survey.
5.1.4 Partitioning Respondents by Date Surveyed
A total of 244 taxpayers were surveyed in the months of April (61 taxpayers),
May (150 taxpayers), and June (33 taxpayers). Potentially, taxpayers could respond
differently when they are in the process of filing a return than when they are not. When
partitioning the first set of NPM-related questions by date of survey, similar results were
obtained on the first four questions. On the final two questions, significantly negative
differences were obtained (P-values of .0158 and .0631). These differences on IRS
employees’ honesty and integrity and IRS’s practices would indicate that the IRS fares
worse with taxpayers in these two areas after the April 15th filing season.
Table 11
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Date Surveyed

NPM-Related Questions
1. IRS employees are just
as knowledgeable as any
private tax expert.
2. I am confident that the
IRS would never try to
take more money from me
than they should.
3. You can depend on the
IRS to keep accurate tax
records.
4. When it comes to
investigating their own
people, the IRS is as
thorough as they are with
everyone else.
5. Employees who work
for the IRS display a high
degree of honesty and
integrity.

After April 15

April 15
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

Mean
Difference

t-statistic
And
P-Value

3.347
1.601
49

3.390
1.457
154

-0.043

-0.167
0.8675

3.862
1.492
58
3.456
1.364
57

3.827
1.519
173
3.494
1.450
176

0.035

0.154
0.8777

-0.038

-0.180
0.8573

3.571
1.458
49

3.881
1.502
134

-0.310

-1.265
0.2075

2.925
1.238
53

3.417
1.353
151

-0.493

-2.433
0.0158

Better/
Worse

Not
Significant
Not
Significant

Not
Significant
Not
Significant

Worse

Table Continued
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6. IRS procedures and
practices are fair and
Worse
-0.408
3.242
3.649
-1.868
reasonable
ones
that
1.454
1.430
0.0631
respect the rights of
60
164
taxpayers.
Taxpayers’ responses were split based on the dates they were surveyed (April 15, or later). This
first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically on a
six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 =
disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree). The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

The overall implications that have been discussed for the NPM-related questions hold
when the survey data is partitioned based on date of survey. As in the prior tables, the
split results only strengthen the implications that taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS have
not improved since the 1998 IRS Reform Act. In the areas of IRS employee honesty and
IRS practices, the IRS was rated statistically worse (P-values of .0158 and .0631) by
those surveyed after April 15.
The next four questions centering on the fairness of system, outside tax
preparation help, audit potential, and type of tax form had similar results, as reflected in
Table 12. Only the question on perceived audit potential was significantly different (Pvalues of .0585).
Table 12
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Date Surveyed

Independent
Questions
1. How do you feel about the federal
income tax system as it applies to the 2003
tax return – do you feel it is quite fair to
most people, or reasonably fair, or
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair to most
people?
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 = reasonably fair, 3
= somewhat unfair, 4 = quite unfair)

April 15
Mean Score,
(Standard
Deviation,
and n)

After April 15

2.508
.878
59

2.623
.888
175

Mean Score,
(Standard
Deviation
and n)

Mean
Difference

-0.114

t-statistic
and
P-value

-0.860
0.3907

Table Continued
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2. During the past few years, how often
have you completed your tax form
yourself, instead of getting help from
someone else? Would you say you always
do them yourself, usually do, sometimes do
or never do them yourself? (Scale: 1 =
always do yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 =
sometimes do, 4 = never do them yourself)

2.883
1.367
60

2.821
1.374
179

0.062

0.304
0.7614

3. An audit is when the IRS asks you to
prove your deductions or answer questions
0.073
0.240
0.167
1.903
about your tax return (either in person or
.25
.182
0.0585
through the mail). Out of every 100
50
148
taxpayers at your income level, what
percent do you think were audited last
year? (Scale on a percentage basis)
4. Which of the following forms did you
use the last time you filed?
-0.145
-0.652
3.017
3.162
a. 1040-EZ
b. 1040-A
1.527
1.281
0.5150
c. 1040 (long form)
58
179
d. 1040 (long form, plus)
e. Don’t remember
(Scale: 1 = 1040-EZ, 2 = 1040-A, 3 =
1040)
Taxpayers’ responses were split based on the dates they were surveyed (April 15 or later). These
were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other. Mean
scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

An interesting result was that taxpayers perceived the potential of a tax audit
much higher around April 15 than afterwards.

Taxpayers perceived a 24 percent

potential of an audit on April 15, whereas later this perceived audit potential dropped to
17 percent. This 30 percent decline is both practically and statically significant (P-value
of .0585). The IRS in the days leading up to April 15 has historically used the public
media to emphasize its enforcement efforts (for example, announcements of high profile
tax litigation). These efforts appear to heighten taxpayers’ awareness of the potential for
IRS audits of tax returns and thus are likely successful.
Overall, results are similar, regardless of when taxpayers were interviewed.
Implications of total survey results are only strengthened when data is split, based on
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state of residence or by date surveyed. Taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS’s taxpayer
service hold, regardless of the prior two data partitions.
5.1.5 Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed
In order to evaluate whether taxpayers’ responses varied by their income, the
results were broken down by the tax forms that they filed (taxpayers must use one of
three filing forms: 1040-EZ, 1040-A, or 1040). Taxpayers could only file the 1040-EZ
and 1040-A if they have under $50,000 in Adjusted Gross Income in 2003. Additionally,
taxpayers are limited by what types of income and deductions that can be reported on
forms 1040-EZ and 1040-A.
The difference between 1040-EZ and 1040-A is the first partition. On the first six
NPM-related questions, there are no significantly different results as reflected in Table
13.
Table 13
Mean Scores for the NPM-Related Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed Comparing 1040-EZ and 1040-A
NPM-Related
Questions
1. IRS employees are just as
knowledgeable as any private
tax expert.
2. I am confident that the IRS
would never try to take more
money from me than they
should.
3. You can depend on the IRS
to keep accurate tax records.
4. When it comes to
investigating their own people,
the IRS is as thorough as they
are with everyone else.

1040-EZ
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

1040-A
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

3.250
1.459
32

2.829
1.263
41

0.421

1.297
0.1988

3.737
1.571
38
3.444
1.501
36
3.656
1.619
32

3.326
1.550
46
3.234
1.386
47
3.825
1.551
40

0.411

1.200
0.2336

0.210

0.653
0.5156

-0.169

-0.449
0.6548

Mean
Difference

t-statistic
And
P-Value

Table Continued
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5. Employees who work for the
IRS display a high degree of
honesty and integrity.

3.176
1.314
34

3.372
1.381
43

-0.196

-0.636
0.5267

6.
IRS
procedures
and
0.475
1.620
3.397
2.922
practices
are
fair
and
1.324
1.243
0.1093
reasonable ones that respect the
34
45
rights of taxpayers.
This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree). The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

The three independent questions (overall system of taxation, degree of return
assistance, and audit potential) are not significantly different as reflected in Table 14.
1040-A taxpayers perceived their audit potential at 18 percent as opposed to 1040-EZ
filers who perceived a 26 percent rate (likely insignificant due to smaller sample sizes).
Table 14
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed Comparing 1040-EZ and 1040-A
Independent
Questions
1. How do you feel about the
federal income tax system as it
applies to the 2003 tax return –
do you feel it is quite fair to most
people, or reasonably fair, or
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair
to most people?
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 =
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat
unfair, 4 = quite unfair)
2. During the past few years, how
often have you completed your
tax form yourself, instead of
getting help from someone else?
Would you say you always do
them yourself, usually do,
sometimes do or never do them
yourself? (Scale: 1 = always do
yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 =
sometimes do, 4 = never do them
yourself)

1040-EZ
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

1040-A
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

2.541
.869
37

2.277
.772
47

0.264

1.451
0.1506

2.923
1.306
39

2.521
1.368
39

0.402

1.398
0.1662

Mean
Difference

t-statistic
and
P-value

Table Continued
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3. An audit is when the IRS asks
you to prove your deductions or
answer questions about your tax
return (either in person or
through the mail). Out of every
100 taxpayers at your income
level, what percent do you think
were audited last year? (Scale on
a percentage basis)

0.261
.281
30

0.178
.188
39

0.083

1.396
0.1673

These three questions are independent of each other. Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and
significant P-values are bolded.

The 1040 and 1040-EZ taxpayers’ survey results were split (see table 15). On the
last question, there was a significant (P-Value of .067) difference on whether taxpayers
viewed IRS procedures as fair and reasonable (all other differences were insignificant).
Taxpayers filing a 1040 had more negatively inclined opinions of the IRS. A possible
reason for a difference could be that higher-income taxpayers (1040 filers) would be
more critical than lower-income taxpayers (1040-EZ filers) because they would pay a
greater amount of taxes. In the other five questions, the IRS’s mean scores remained
above 3.0 (“somewhat agree”) and thus are negative, and all were not significantly
different.
Table 15
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed Comparing 1040 and 1040-EZ
NPM-Related
Questions
1. IRS employees are just as
knowledgeable as any private
tax expert.
2. I am confident that the IRS
would never try to take more
money from me than they
should.

1040
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

1040-EZ
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

3.686
1.502
102

3.250
1.459
32

0.436

1.465
0.1453

4.054
1.464
111

3.737
1.571
38

0.317

1.093
0.2762

Mean
Difference

t-statistic
and
P-Value

Table Continued
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3. You can depend on the IRS to
keep accurate tax records.
4.
When
it
comes
to
investigating their own people,
the IRS is as thorough as they
are with everyone else.
5. Employees who work for the
IRS display a high degree of
honesty and integrity.
6. IRS procedures and practices
are fair and reasonable ones that
respect the rights of taxpayers.

3.661
1.414
115

3.444
1.501
36

0.216

0.765
0.4455

3.839
1.430
87
3.327
1.365
101
3.891
1.486
110

3.656
1.619
320
3.176
1.314
34
3.397
1.324
34

0.183

0.563
0.5737

0.150

0.571
0.5690

0.494

1.845
0.0671

This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree). The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

On the questions regarding fairness of the system and outside tax preparation
help, similar results were obtained (Table 16).

There is a statistically significant

difference (P-value of .0257) in perceived audit potential.

Taxpayers who file 1040’s

saw their audit potential as 14 percent, as opposed to 1040-EZ taxpayers who perceived
their audit potential as 26 percent.
Table 16
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed Comparing 1040 and 1040-EZ

Independent
Questions
1. How do you feel about the
federal income tax system as it
applies to the 2003 tax return –
do you feel it is quite fair to most
people, or reasonably fair, or
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair
to most people?
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 =
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat
unfair, 4 = quite unfair)

1040
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

1040-EZ
Mean Score,
(Standard
Deviation
and n)

2.688
.881
112

2.541
.869
37

Mean
Difference

0.147

t-statistic
And
P-Value

0.889
0.3755

Table Continued
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2. During the past few years, how
often have you completed your
tax form yourself, instead of
-0.225
-0.911
2.698
2.923
getting help from someone else?
1.416
1.306
0.3637
Would you say you always do
them yourself, usually do,
116
39
sometimes do or never do them
yourself? (Scale: 1 = always do
yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 =
sometimes do, 4 = never do them
yourself)
3. An audit is when the IRS asks
-0.120
0.141
0.261
2.257
you to prove your deductions or
.141
.281
0.0257
answer questions about your tax
return (either in person or
99
30
through the mail). Out of every
100 taxpayers at your income
level, what percent do you think
were audited last year? (Scale on
a percentage basis)
These were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics and significant P-values are bolded.

The final partition compares taxpayers who file 1040 versus 1040-A (Table 17).
Here there were significant differences (P-values of less than .01) on three of the six
questions (IRS knowledge, IRS and money, IRS’s ability to keep accurate tax records,
and IRS procedures). However, the IRS only received marginally positive ratings (mean
scores below 3.0) by 1040-A filers in two categories (IRS knowledge and IRS
procedures) and on the other four categories the IRS’s ratings were marginally negative.
In other words, despite these two slightly different results, the implication that taxpayers
do not perceive “top quality service” holds.

From an overall tax administration

perspective, 1040 filers make up the vast majority of taxpayers and revenue contributors.
Thus, their less favorable evaluations only add to the implications of a failure of the IRS
to provide a high level of service.
On the individual question concerning the overall tax system’s fairness, 1040
filers’ responses were significantly worse (P-value of .0038) than 1040-A filers’
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responses. On the other two questions, the results were not significantly different, as
reflected in Table 18.
Table 17
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed Comparing 1040 and 1040-A

NPM-Related
Questions
1. IRS employees are just
as knowledgeable as any
private tax expert.

1040
Mean Score,
(Standard
Deviation,
and n)

1040-A
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

3.686
1.502
102

2.829
1.263
41

0.857

3.469
0.0007

4.054
1.464
111
3.661
1.414
115
3.839
1.430
87

3.326
1.550
46
3.234
1.386
47
3.825
1.551
40

0.728

2.722
0.0072

0.427

1.769
0.0788

2. I am confident that the
IRS would never try to take
more money from me than
they should.
3. You can depend on the
IRS to keep accurate tax
records.

Mean
Difference

t-statistic
and
P-Value

4. When it comes to
0.014
0.048
investigating their own
0.9618
people, the IRS is as
thorough as they are with
everyone else.
5. Employees who work for
-0.045
-0.180
3.327
3.372
the IRS display a high
1.365
1.381
0.8574
degree of honesty and
101
43
integrity.
6. IRS procedures and
0.969
3.891
2.922
4.154
practices are fair and
1.486
1.243
0.0001
reasonable
ones
that
110
45
(less than)
respect the rights of
taxpayers.
This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree). The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

Taxpayers’ perceptions of their audit potential varied in a uniform pattern.
Taxpayers with generally higher reporting requirements rated their audit potential the
lowest and taxpayers with the least reporting requirements had the highest perceived
audit potential. From a tax compliance standpoint, one could argue that it is beneficial
for the IRS that taxpayers perceive the audit potential to be greatly in excess of the actual
rate. Figure 10 reflects this pattern.
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Table 18
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions,
Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed Comparing 1040 and 1040-A
1040
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation,
and n)

1040-A
Mean Score,
(Standard Deviation
and n)

t-statistic
and
Independent
Mean
P-Value
Questions
Difference
1. How do you feel about the
federal income tax system as it
applies to the 2003 tax return –
do you feel it is quite fair to most
people, or reasonably fair, or
0.411
2.688
2.277
2.935
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair
.881
.772
0.0038
to most people?
112
47
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 =
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat
unfair, 4 = quite unfair)
2. During the past few years, how
often have you completed your
tax form yourself, instead of
getting help from someone else?
0.177
0.748
2.698
2.521
Would you say you always do
them yourself, usually do,
1.416
1.368
0.4556
sometimes do or never do them
116
39
yourself? (Scale: 1 = always do
yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 =
sometimes do, 4 = never do them
yourself)
3. An audit is when the IRS asks
you to prove your deductions or
-0.037
-1.125
0.141
0.178
answer questions about your tax
return (either in person or
.141
.188
0.2626
through the mail). Out of every
99
39
100 taxpayers at your income
level, what percent do you think
were audited last year? (Scale on
a percentage basis)
These were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other.
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.

Taxpayers with the least revenue perceived their audit potential at greater than 25
percent. Conversely, taxpayers with the greatest revenue potential perceived less of an
audit potential (15 percent). In all cases, the perceived audit potential is not reflective of
the current audit potential of about 1 percent. The IRS’s audit activity is publicly
perceived as much more prevalent than it actually is. This vast overestimation of audit
rates by taxpayers was seen in both 2004 and in 1990.
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Figure 10
Taxpayers’ Perceived Differentiation in Audit Potential Versus Actual Audit Rate
The above Figure reflects the perceived audit potential of taxpayers by the tax forms they file
and compares their audit perception to their actual chance of getting audited.
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5.2 Taxpayer Compliance
Both within and outside the IRS, many assume that taxpayer compliance has
decreased due to the IRS’s diversion of resources from its audit function into taxpayer
service. Treasury Secretary John Snow’s Congressional testimony from May 2004 reads
in part (U.S. Department of Treasury 2004, 2):
In past years, IRS’s focus has been on improving customer service. We believe
that we have been successful in that effort and are committed to further
enhancing customer service for the vast majority of American taxpayers who do
their best to pay their fair share. For those who do not, fundamental fairness
requires that our enforcement efforts in FY 2005 continue moving us towards a
tax system in which everyone is complying with the tax laws. Our FY 2005
request, which includes a net increase of $300 million, will focus our resources
toward enforcement initiatives designed to curb abusive tax practices, end the
proliferation of abusive tax shelters, improve methods of identifying tax fraud,
identify and stop promoters of illegal tax schemes and scams, and increase the
number and effectiveness of audits to ensure compliance with the tax laws.
However, the JCT, in its 1998 year-end analysis21 of the 1998 IRS Reform Act predicted
that adoption of a customer service orientation by the IRS would “have no effect on
Federal fiscal year budget receipts” (JCT 1998, 18).
In order to empirically test the effect of the 1998 IRS Reform Act on taxpayer
compliance, the tax gap measure of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) was studied
in conjunction with major IRS enforcement measures that the JCT subsequently
identified as key areas of concerns in its annual reviews of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.
These variables include the number of tax auditors, successful IRS tax litigation, hours
the IRS agents spent auditing returns, and no change rate (percentage of audits where the
IRS accepts the return as filed). The 1998 IRS Reform Act (the key variable of interest)
is included as a binary variable in the model.
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The proxy variable for taxpayer compliance is the BEA estimate of the Adjusted
Gross Income Gap (AGI) from 1981 to 2001. The AGI-Gap is converted to a percentage
basis (BEA-AGI minus the IRS-AGI divided by the BEA-AGI, see Appendix IV).
Figure 11 shows the AGI-Gap from 1981 to 2001.

16%
14%
12%
10%
AGI-GAP

8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

Figure 11
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Adjusted Gross Income – Gap
From 1981 to 2001
The above Figure shows the BEA-calculated Adjusted Gross Income Gap (AGI-Gap) as a
percentage of total BEA-AGI (BEA-AGI minus the IRS-AGI divided by the BEA-AGI).
Utilizing a percentage basis overcomes inflationary influences. A line is superimposed for year
1998. See Appendix IV for the data (BEA-AGI, IRS-AGI, BEA-Gap and BEA Gap percentage)
in table form.

The increase for 1998 could likely reflect that IRS enforcement activities were coming
under intense public scrutiny in Congressional hearings and taxpayers reacted with a
short–term decrease in compliance behavior. The upward movement of 2001 could
possibly reflect the growing perception of a lax enforcement environment by at least

21

Within the tax profession, this year-end analysis by the JCT is commonly referred to as the “Blue Book”
because of the color of its cover. The JCT at year-end provides guidance/insight as to Congressional intent
relative to tax laws enacted during the year. This guidance is often considered authoritative.

62

some taxpayers (in the 2004 survey, 20% perceived the audit rate as 2.5 percent or lower)
– a more long term effect.
The IRS, in carrying out the mandates of the 1998 IRS Reform Act, reallocated
direct audit personnel positions to other positions and divisions. The total number of IRS
personnel has remained fairly constant since 1997 at approximately 100,000 employees,
as reflected in Figure 12.
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Total IRS
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40,000
20,000
0

Figure 12
IRS’s Total Personnel from 1981 to 2001
This figure reflects the total IRS personnel including audit personnel on an annualized basis. A
line is superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for data in table form.

While total IRS employees remained constant from 1997 to 2002, the total
number of IRS audit agents and auditors fell from 16,935 to 13,510 (a 20 percent
decrease).

Additionally, audit personnel peaked in 1988 and 1989 when there were

nearly 20,000 total audit personnel. This is reflected in Figure 13.

63

25,000
20,000
15,000

IRS Audit
Personnel

10,000
5,000
0

Figure 13
IRS Audit Personnel from 1981 to 2001
The Figure reflects the total number of IRS auditors on an annualized basis. A line is
superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for data in table form.

The previous two Figures reflect that as a result of the 1998 IRS Reform Act a
significant reallocation of resources occurred within the IRS. Enforcement personnel
were reallocated within the IRS to customer service positions. As the JCT (1998, 33)
observed, “The Commissioner announced a broad outline of a plan to reorganize the
structure of the IRS in order to help make the IRS more oriented toward assisting
taxpayers and providing better taxpayer service.” The reality is that without an increase
in total IRS personnel the IRS had to reassign personnel.
This major realignment of resources within the IRS is likely to have affected other
enforcement efforts. The number of successful IRS tax litigation cases is hypothesized
by the JCT to be related to the 1998 IRS Reform Act. Figure 14 shows the number of
successful tax litigation cases from 1981 to 2001, with a significant decline after the 1998
IRS Reform Act.
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Figure 14
Successful IRS Tax Litigation Cases from 1981 to 2001
This figure reflects the total number of successful IRS tax litigation cases on an annualized basis.
A line is superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for the above data in table form.

While the number of successful litigations has declined since mid-1985, after the 1998
IRS Reform Act this decreasing trend accelerated. The year axis in Figure 14 is difficult
to decipher. More specifically, in 1997 there were 873 successful IRS prosecutions (a
3% increase from 1996) and in 1998 there were only 766 (a 14% decline from 1997).
See Appendix V for total IRS prosecutions from 1981 through 2001. Other factors,
besides the reallocation of IRS audit personnel, were part of the environment. After
1998, the IRS claims it was faced with mounting frivolous challenges when pursuing tax
litigation. The JCT (2003, 87) observed:
The IRS Reform Act added several due process provisions that increased
taxpayer rights during the collection process, such as pre-lien and pre-levy
hearings and judicial review of such hearings.
After the 1998 IRS Reform Act, successful tax litigation cases dropped nearly in half (as
reflected in Figure 14).
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The average time spent auditing a return was identified as an area of concern by
the JCT in its review of the 1998 IRS Reform Act and is shown in Figure 15 (1992 to
2001). Since 1998, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of hours spent
auditing a return due to additional audit procedures that were put into place to better
protect taxpayer rights. For example, extensive documentation requirements, checklists,
and greater supervisory reviews were added after the 1998 IRS Reform Act to protect
audited taxpayers’ rights. Overall, certain IRS agents would contend that this increase in
“paperwork” hampers the IRS’s audit ability.
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Figure 15
Time IRS Agents Spent Auditing a Return from 1992 to 2001
This figure reflects the number hours a typical IRS audit takes on an annualized basis. A line is
superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for the above data in table form.

The number of audited tax returns with changes since 1992 is shown in Figure 16.
Since 1998, there has been a dramatic decline in the number of audited returns with
changes. The number of returns with changes is used as a proxy for the “no change” rate.
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Figure 16
Audited Tax Returns with Changes from 1992 to 2001This figure reflects the
number of tax returns audited with changes on an annualized basis. A line is superimposed for
year 1998. See Appendix V for data in table form.

After the 1998 IRS Reform Act, a dramatic decrease in the number of audits with
changes occurred (this trend is nearly continuous). A likely factor in this change is a less
aggressive audit posture on the part of IRS auditors. As the JCT observed in 2003, “IRS
employees frequently report that fear of a Section 120322 allegation causes reluctance to
take appropriate enforcement actions” (JCT 2003, 45). A limitation in adding the audit
hour variable and the variable on IRS audit changes is that the data is only available back
to 1992.
Proxies for tax complexity and changes are the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the
magnitude of this Tax Act was so great that Congress re-designated the name of the tax
code to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) and the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990
(which expanded the number of different tax rates from two to three and initiated the
22

Section 1203 of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was titled, “Termination of Employment for Misconduct.” It
established ten conditions that would result in expedited termination of an IRS employee. Audit personnel
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undoing of many of the 1986 simplifications/changes). Both of these Acts are modeled
as binary variables, as is the variable of interest, the 1998 IRS Reform Act.
In general, the effect from the above enforcement measures on the number of
audit agents, tax litigation, time spent auditing a return, and no change rate are likely
interrelated. The IRS is planning to focus on improving enforcement through a multistep process incorporating these variables. As the JCT observed (2003, 63):
The IRS reports that the improvements will enable the IRS to increase the level
of reporting and filing compliance, reduce “no-change” rates, and focus
available resources on abusive trusts, shelters, and complex tax issues.

The following tables show correlations among these variables measured by the
Pearson Correlation Coefficient (Table 19) and the Spearman Correlation Coefficient
(Table 20). Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients are shown in the below
table. Under the Pearson Correlation, a ratio scale is utilized (normality is assumed).
Table 19
Pearson Correlations
R98
R98

Pearson Correlation

GAP

ADT

LIT

HRS

CHG

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
GAP

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

ADT

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

LIT

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-0.224

1

0.330
21
-0.825

-0.173

1

0.000

0.452

21

21

-0.690

0.173

0.561

0.001

0.453

0.008

21

21

21

1

Table Continued

with multi-year service with IRS were potentially highly threatened by this provision due to the possible
direct loss of capital such as retirement benefits.
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HRS

Pearson Correlation

0.761

-0.515

-0.881

-0.868

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.011

0.127

0.001

0.001

10

10

10

10

-0.914

0.621

0.957

0.891

-0.949

0.000

0.055

0.000

0.001

0.000

N
CHG

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

1

1

N
10
10
10
10
10
R98 = 1998 IRS Reform Act, GAP = BEA-AGI Gap, ADT = number of IRS Auditors, LIT =
IRS successful tax litigation cases, HRS = number of hours spent auditing a return, and CHG =
number of IRS audited tax returns with changes. Sig. = significance level, and N = number of
observations. Significant P-values are bolded.

Only the number of audited returns with a “tax change” variable in this correlation
table is marginally significant related to the tax gap (P-value less than .06). The 1998
IRS Reform Act variable is significantly related to all variables except for the tax gap (Pvalues less than .012). After 1998, there was a significant decrease in the number of
auditors (P-value of .000), tax litigation cases (P-value of .001), and audited returns with
changes (P-value of .000). The hours spent auditing a return increased significantly (Pvalue of .011). Overall, apparently, based on the above table, the JCT-identified IRS
enforcement measures are interrelated and statistically significant to the 1998 IRS
Reform Act.
In Table 20, the rank order of the variables is measured by utilizing the Spearman
Correlation Coefficient. This coefficient assumes that the distribution is not normal; thus,
a nonparametric statistic is calculated.
Table 20
Spearman Correlations
R98
R98

Spearman Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

GAP

ADT

LIT

HRS

CHG

1

Table Continued
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Spearman Correlation
-0.280
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.218
N
21
21
Spearman Correlation
-0.268
1
ADT
-0.681
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.241
0.001
N
21
21
Spearman Correlation
0.158
0.366
1
LIT
-0.681
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.493
0.103
0.001
N
21
21
21
21
Spearman Correlation
1
HRS
0.782
-0.709
-0.648
-0.685
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.008
0.022
0.043
0.029
N
10
10
10
10
CHG Spearman Correlation
-0.853
0.733
0.794
0.721
-0.915
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.002
0.016
0.006
0.019
0.000
N
10
10
10
10
10
Gap = BEA-AGI Gap, ADT = IRS Auditors, LIT = IRS successful tax litigation cases, HRS =
number of hours spent auditing a return, CHG = number of IRS audited tax returns with
changes, and R98 = 1998 IRS Reform Act. Rho = Spearman Correlation coefficient, Sig. =
significance level, and N = number of observations.
GAP

1

Here, under a monotonic relationship, a statistically significant relationship is indicated
between the tax gap, audit hours (P-value of .022), and number of audits with changes (Pvalue of .016). The statistically significant relationships (P-values of less than .01)
between the 1998 IRS Reform Act and all of the independent variables holds as well (as
seen in the prior table).

The two previous correlation tables show that all of the

dependent variable measures are correlated.
When the correlations were calculated based on the first difference technique,23
the audit variable and the BEA-AGI Gap variable are significantly inversely related (Pvalue of .063).

This result indicates that more auditors lead to a smaller tax gap;

conversely, fewer auditors equate to a larger tax gap.

23

When time series data is utilized, there is the potential for serial correlation data (residuals are correlated
with their lag values) and the first difference technique can control for this.
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Multivariate models were analyzed utilizing the above data sets.24

When the

above model is run without the audit hours and audit change variables, the data set goes
back to 1981. This expanded data set in terms of years means that only 3 of the model’s
20 degrees of freedom are used by the regression, and thus, the model has appreciably
more data to calculate coefficients and significance levels. The resulting model is shown
in Table 21.
Table 21
Modeling 1981 to 2001
GAP Regressed on Audit Hours, Tax Litigation, and the 1998 IRS Reform Act
Adjusted
Std. Error of
DurbinR-Square R-Square
the Estimate
F-statistic
P-Value
Watson
0.450
0.353
0.008057
4.638915 0.015142
1.932

(Constant)
ADT
LIT
R98

Coefficients
.2394283829
-.0000068723
.0000006568
-.0281729901

Coefficients
Standard
Standardized
Error
Beta
.0366807379
.0000019555
-1.117557
.0000083293
0.019592
.0090512055
-1.131659

t-statistic P-Values
6.527360 0.000005
-3.514268 0.002660
0.078859 0.938066
-3.112623 0.006331

This table regressed all variables with data back to 1981 on the BEA-GAP. The audit personnel
(ADT) and 1998 IRS Reform Act (R98) variables are significantly related to the tax gap.
Predictors: (Constant), audit personnel, successful IRS tax litigation, and the 1998 IRS Reform
Act. The dependent variable is the BEA-GAP proxy.

A robust model is indicated in the above table (Table 21).25 The Adjusted R-Square
indicates that 35 percent of the variation in the model is being explained, and the FStatistic is highly significant (P-value of .015). The Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistic

24

Multivariate regression was run using the full data set. A limitation of this model is that two of the five
independent variables (audit hours and audited tax returns with changes) only go back to 1992. Thus the
regression uses 5 of the 9 degrees of freedom. Neither the model F-statistic nor the t-statistic achieves
significance, most likely due to the low number of observations. However, this model with all variables
had an adjusted R-square (.29), which indicates the model has some predictive value.
25
A lag effect was modeled by regressing the prior year’s BEA-AGI gap by the then current year’s audits,
litigation cases, and the 1998 IRS Reform Act variables. The model results remain highly constant; both the
audit personnel and the 1998 IRS Reform Act variables remain statistically significant and negative (PValues of .004 and .020 respectively).
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(1.932) indicates that serial correlation is not present. A DW of 2.0 implies no serial
correlation.
Both AUDIT and the 1998 IRS Reform Act coefficients (P-values of less than
.01) indicate that the 1998 IRS Reform Act had an effect on tax compliance. The above
model strongly indicates that the decrease in tax auditors resulted in an increase in the
predicted tax gap. In other words, more tax auditors lead to a smaller adjusted gross
income gap.
Conversely, the negative and significant coefficient for the 1998 IRS Reform Act
coefficient (P-value of .006) indicates a smaller adjusted gross income gap after 1998.26
This result implies that a possible effect of the comprehensive changes on tax
administration is that tax compliance has been affected positively. Some in Congress
argued that a fairer IRS would lead to greater voluntary compliance. The JCT, in its
review of Congressional intent in passing the 1998 IRS Reform Act, stated that (JCT
1998, 35):
Public confidence in the IRS must be restored so that our system of voluntary
compliance will not be compromised. The Congress believed that most
Americans are willing to pay their fair share of taxes, and that public confidence
in the IRS is key to maintaining that willingness.

The two indicator variables for tax complexity/changes (1986 and 1990 Tax Acts)
were next incorporated into the model. The resulting model is shown in Table 22. The
model’s F-statistic remains significant, and the adjusted R-square explains over 31
percent of the variation in the model. Both the AUDIT and the 1998 IRS Reform Act
coefficients remain negative and significant (P-values of less than .04). Serial correlation

26

Running the model by altering the year (1997 or 1998) of the 1998 IRS Reform Act Variable did not
significantly change the model.

72

is once again not indicated. The model has a DW statistic of 1.92 where a DW of 2.0
indicates no serial correlation.

R-Square
.486

(Constant)
ADT
LIT
A86
A90
R98

Table 22
Modeling 1981 to 2001
With Tax Complexity Control Variables Added
Adjusted
Std. Error of
R-Square
the Estimate
F-statistic
P-Value
.315
0.008293
2.836
0.054

Coefficients
.2311547010
-.0000057620
-.0000058822
-.0039530154
-.0026444046
-.0252528234

Coefficients
Standard
Standardized
Error
Beta
.0464125281
.0000024279
-0.937000
.0000145329
-0.175451
.0069969768
-0.172227
.0083578579
-0.133865
.0110769049
-1.014361

DurbinWatson
1.923

t-statistic
4.980438
-2.373271
-0.404752
-0.564960
-0.316397
-2.279773

P-Values
0.000164
0.031422
0.691373
0.580453
0.756061
0.037667

This table regressed variables with data back to 1981 on the BEA-GAP. The audit personnel
(ADT) and 1998 IRS Reform Act (R98) variables are significantly related to the tax gap. The
two tax complexity/changes variables 1986 Tax Act (A86) and 1990 Tax Act (A90) are not
significant. Predictors: (Constant), audit personnel, successful IRS tax litigation (LIT), 1986 Tax
Act, 1990 Tax Act and the 1998 IRS Reform Act. The dependent variable is the BEA-GAP
proxy.

Overall, the above modeling indicates the 1998 IRS Reform Act likely had a
positive effect on tax compliance initially. The 1998 IRS Reform Act indicator variable
is both negative and highly statistically significant (P-value less than .01).

This

coefficient indicates that after the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the AGI reporting gap declined.
In other words, there was better overall tax compliance after 1998. With more outer year
data, these interesting results can be corroborated. This result is directly opposite of what
would be expected based on current Congressional and IRS statements of what is
perceived as erosion in tax compliance. However, the statistically significant negative
relation of the audit variable (P-value of less than .01) to the tax gap indicates a strong
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correlation between direct audit enforcement and adherence to correct income reporting
to the IRS. These relationships imply that Congressional and IRS concerns are justified;
however, the catalyst is not the 1998 IRS Reform Act but the decline in tax auditors. As
reflected in Figure 13 the number of IRS audit personnel dropped from approximately
20,000 in the late 1980s to 17,000 in 1997 and to 13,500 in 2001.
5.2.1 Taxpayer Compliance in the Context of NPM
Under a traditional management orientation to government operations, key
attributes are economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. A rational (cost-benefit) approach
is taken to budgeting in this traditional bureaucratic structure. The inverse relationship
between auditors and the tax reporting gap indicates, from a compliance perspective, that
one cost of the IRS’s adopting an NPM methodology was a decrease in the economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of tax enforcement. Importantly, Congress all but formally
mandated this reallocation of resources by requiring the IRS to reorganize and focus on
taxpayer service (specifically mandated in the first two sections of the 1998 IRS Reform
Act) and Congress did not provide additional resources in terms of personnel. The IRS
simply switched resources from enforcement to service. As Bergin and Brown (2003)
observed, the IRS got the message.
The initial results of the 1998 IRS Reform Act resulting in better compliance are
tentative and need to be verified with more data in subsequent years. If this result holds,
it would indicate that a key NPM tenet of treating individuals as customers instead of
impersonal actors resulted in a “better functioning government.” As Bagby and Franke
(2001) observed, this is a central outcome measure of whether an NPM orientation is
successful.
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5.3 IRS’s Personnel Environment
The third goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was to provide “IRS employees with a
quality work environment” and was called for in “Subtitle C-Personnel Flexibilities” of
the 1998 IRS Reform Act. The third hypothesis predicts that there is no change in the
IRS’s work environment from this legislative change. This hypothesis is tested by
analyzing data the IRS provided for the JCT’s 2003 data request relative to salaries for
critical pay positions (§1201) and IRS-mandated employee termination (§1203).
5.3.1 §1201Critical Pay Authority
In general, the salary provision is in keeping with NPM’s private market focus (other
than it had an upper cap). The U.S. Treasury Secretary was delegated broad authority to
institute a program to match private sector pay, but with a salary limitation of $175,400.
The JCT (1998, 46) observed:
The Act provides OMB with authority to set the pay for certain critical pay
positions requested by the Secretary under section 5377 of title 5 of the United
States Code at levels higher than authorized under prior law. These critical pay
positions are critical, technical, administrative and professional positions other
than those designated under the streamlined authority. Under the Act, OMB is
authorized to approve requests for critical position pay up to the rate of pay of
the Vice President (currently, $175,400).
Congress granted this critical pay authority with the intention of bringing in private
sector talent that the IRS was lacking. The JCT observed (1998, 47):
The Congress believed that as part of restructuring the IRS, the Commissioner
should have the ability to bring in experts and the flexibility to revitalize the
current IRS workforce. The current hiring practices often inhibit the ability of
the Commissioner to change the IRS’ institutional culture. Commissioner
Rossotti has indicated that, in order to maximize efforts to transform the IRS
into an efficient, modern and responsive agency, the ability to recruit and retain
a top-notch leadership and technical team is critical.
The Congress believed the IRS needs the flexibility to recruit employees from
the private sector, to redesign its salary and incentive structures to reward
employees who meet their objectives, and to hold non-performers accountable.
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Personnel and pay flexibilities are necessary prerequisites for larger fundamental
changes in the IRS.
The majority of these created positions are paid near this cap (when their bonus is
considered). The following figure shows the comparisons between the IRS executives’
salaries and their prior private sector pay (actual salaries paid to individual IRS
executives are shown in Appendix VI).
Figure 17
IRS Executive Pay Comparison
$1,200,000

$1,000,000

$800,000

Pre-IRS salary
$600,000

IRS salary

$400,000

$200,000

$0

The above figure is from salary data provided by the IRS for the JCT’s 2003 (132) data request.
The IRS reported individual executive salaries and even specifically identified individuals and
their salaries (prior to IRS employment and their IRS salary). See Appendix VI for data in table
form.

Figure 17 and Table 23 convey the reality that private sector pay, in general, was not
matched in most cases. However, the Treasury Secretary did provide the salaries nearly
up to the established ceiling in almost all situations (as indicated by a nearly parallel line
around $200,000).

The descriptive statistics and statistical comparison of the IRS

executives’ prior salaries to their IRS salaries are shown in Table 23 (Panel A and B).
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Table 23
Panel A: IRS Executive Salaries Descriptive Statistics
Prior
IRS
%
Statistic
Salary
Salary
Difference
Difference
Mean
$248,092
$174,978
-$73,114
-29.47%
Standard Deviation
185,300.80
19,064.95
166,235.85
Median
$197,000.00 $181,400.00
-$15,600.00
-7.92%
Sample Variance
34,336,387,794 363,472,194 33,972,915,913
Kurtosis
5.0418
-0.4734
Skewness
2.0917
-0.9251
Range
$934,600
$62,600
$872,000
-93.30%
Minimum
$65,400
$130,000
-$64,600
98.78%
Maximum
$1,000,000
$192,600
-$807,400
80.47%
Sum
$12,156,523
$8,573,900
-$3,582,623
-29.47%
Count
49
49
This table shows a descriptive comparison of IRS employees’ compensation immediately prior
to employment at the IRS (Prior Salary) and their compensation at the IRS (IRS Salary). For the
specific individuals and their salary comparisons, see Appendix VI.

Panel B: T-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Prior
Statistic
Salary
Pearson Correlation
0.525424445
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
Degrees of Freedom
48
t – Statistic
2.91
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.0028
t Critical one-tail
1.68
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.0055
t -Critical two-tail
2.01
This table statistically compares the salaries of IRS critical pay employees’ salaries (IRS Salary)
to what they received immediately prior to working for the IRS (Prior Salary). For the specific
individual and their salary comparison, see Appendix VI.

On average, IRS Employees received $73,114 (29 percent) less than their private
sector pay, on a median basis of $15,600 (8 percent less). In aggregate, those employed
in the critical pay positions received $12.2 million in private sector pay, but the IRS paid
them only $8.6 million. A t-test of the sample means reveals that the pay disparity is
statistically significant at a P-value of less than .01 (two tailed).
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Despite the greater pay authority provided in the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the IRS
was still prevented from matching private sector salaries. A ceiling of $175,400 was
placed on the salaries and the IRS was actually paid $174,978 (some salaries exceed this
limitation through bonus awards).27 In the private sector, these positions paid an average
of $248,092. This disparity is not surprising considering the high dollar stakes involved
in matters of taxation.28
There are clearly outliers in the data for IRS executives’ private sector pay.
However, excluding the six executives with salaries of $500,000 or more does not change
the overall implications of the results. Excluding these data points, the IRS still underpaid the private sector by over $1.2 million (15 percent less). The average pay was
$28,000 (15 percent) less and the median pay was $21,000 (11 percent) less.

These

salary differences are reflected in Tables 24 (Panels A and B). This difference is
statistically significant at a P-value of less than 1.5 percent (two-tail).
Table 24
Panel A: IRS Executive Salaries - Descriptive Statistics
(Minus 6 highest paid executives prior to working for the IRS)
%
Prior
IRS
Statistic
Salary
Salary
Difference
Difference
Mean
$190,160
$161,928
($28,232)
-14.85%
Standard Deviation
$87,323
$22,665
($64,658)
Median
$186,000
$165,000
($21,000)
-11.30%
Sample Variance
$7,625,372,991
$513,715,393 ($7,111,657,598)
Kurtosis
$1
-$1
Skewness
$1
$0
Table Continued

27

“Performance awards for senior executives” were included in the data analysis. The 1998 IRS Reform
Act provided for these bonuses.
28
As noted in footnote 5, Myron S. Scholes (Nobel Prize winner in Economics and co-author of the
seminal Taxes and Business Strategy) was caught in a high stakes tax avoidance scheme.
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Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

$397,600
$65,400
$463,000
$8,176,862
43

$67,600
$125,000
$192,600
$6,962,900
43

($330,000)
$59,600
($270,400)
($1,213,962)

91.13%
-58.40%
-14.85%

This table shows a descriptive comparison of IRS employees’ compensation immediately prior
to employment at the IRS (Prior Salary) and their compensation at the IRS (IRS Salary)
excluding the six highest paid employees (prior IRS salary). The data was provided as part of the
2003 JCT data request. (For the specific individuals and their salary comparisons, see Appendix
VI.)

Panel B: T-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
(Minus 6 highest paid executives prior to working for the IRS)
Prior
Statistic
Salary
Pearson Correlation
0.7464
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0.0000
Degrees of Freedom
42.0000
t – Statistic
2.5711
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.0069
t Critical one-tail
1.6820
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.0138
t Critical two-tail
2.0181
This table statistically compares the salaries of IRS critical pay employees’ salaries (IRS Salary)
to what they received immediately prior to working for the IRS (Prior Salary). For the specific
individuals and their salary comparisons, see Appendix VI.

Based on the prior salary analysis, the IRS is still lacking in its ability to match
private sector pay in critical executive positions.

One could argue that high-level

executives within the U.S. government can be motivated by factors other than
compensation (i.e., a human relations orientation versus a scientific management
approach). For example, one may be inspired to promote public good or one may be
motivated by the greater job security that is often present in the governmental sector.
However, this potential factor is controlled for, in part, by excluding the highest salaries.
The remaining executives are likely to be highly motivated by the remaining salary
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differential of nearly $30,000 when they have an average IRS salary of $161,928. Likely
offsetting the public good component for some of these employees is their ability to
benefit from their high-level IRS positions upon re-entering the private sector. The JCT
observed (2003, 48):
From the passage of the IRS Reform Act in July 1998 through March 31, 2003,
the IRS has hired 49 Streamlined Critical Pay executives, 32 of which currently
are working for the IRS. Through March 31, 2003, 17 Streamlined Critical Pay
executives have left the IRS. Average tenure of the executives who have left is
21 months, with some staying as few as five months and others as long as 42
months.
Currently, these critical pay positions have an attrition rate of 35 percent. If pay parity
were actually achieved, it is highly conceivable that a lower turnover rate would occur; at
the least, there would be less of a compensation motivation.
5.3.2 §1203 IRS Employee Termination
Under “Subtitle C-Personnel Flexibilities,” the IRS was directed to terminate
employees who violated provisions that were viewed by Congress as grievous. The JCT
observed (1998, 50):
The Act requires the IRS to terminate an employee for certain proven violations
committed by the employee in connection with the performance of official
duties.
Of the 3,970 potential §1203 violations, nearly 40% were deemed to have some degree of
merit.

There were 490 substantiated violations (12 percent) and 1,034 serious

misconduct violations, but not to the level of §1203 violations (26 percent). Nearly 60
percent were deemed not to be substantiated. These numbers are reflected in Table 25,
which categorizes potential §1203 violations.
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Table 25
Potential §1203 Violations
§1203
Other
Not
§1203 Violations
Misconduct Misconduct Substantiated Totals
Seizure Without Approval
1
2
13
16
False Statement Under Oath
1
3
17
21
Constitutional & Civil Rights issues
1
14
265
280
Falsifying or Destroying Documents
10
22
36
68
Assault or Battery
1
6
5
12
Retaliate or Harass
6
126
1,633 1,765
Misuse of §6103
0
0
3
3
Failure to File a Federal Tax Return
386
362
250
998
Understatement of Federal Tax
Liability
Threat to Audit for Personal Gain
Totals

71
13
490
12.34%

476
23
1,034
26.05%

175
49
2,446
61.61%

722
85
3,970

This table reflects potential §1203 violations and is a modification of an IRS table provided as a
result of 2003 JCT (156) data request. The IRS strategically focused attention on the fact that
only 490 actual §1203 violations occurred. This overlooks the other 1,034 violations that
resulted in considerable administrative action (in most cases).

The IRS actually titled the above columns §1203 misconduct, §1203 non-misconduct (retitled above as other misconduct) and not-substantiated. This labeling was strategic in
that §1203 non-misconduct still involved instances of substantial transgressions.
A total of 203 employees were removed or left (resigned /retired) because of these
serious §1203 violations. In over 45 percent of the cases, the penalty resulted in IRS
employees no longer working for the IRS. The violations and the resolutions are reported
in Table 26. Tables 25 and 26 reflect that the majority of cases involved some type of
return filing violations over 90 percent of the time (failure to file or understatement of
tax).
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§1203 Violations
Seizure
False Statement
Constitutional & Civil
Falsifying or Destroying
Assault or Battery
Retaliate or Harass
Misuse of 6103
Failure to File
Understatement of Tax
Threat to Audit
Totals
%

Removal
0
0
0
3
1
1
0
60
11
5
81

Table 26
Substantiated §1203 Violations
Probation
Resigned
or
Removal
or Retired Separation
(other)
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
5
1
0
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
92
13
15
16
1
1
4
2
1
122
17
19

Penalty
Mitigated
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
175
18
1
194

In
Review
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
31
24
0
57

Total
1
1
1
10
1
6
0
386
71
13
490

16.53%
24.90%
3.47%
3.88%
39.59% 11.63%
Of 490 substantiated §1203 violations cases, over 40 resulted in IRS employees’ removal from service (one
way or another). This table is a modification of an IRS table provided as a result of a 2003 JCT (157) data
request.

Table 26 does not reflect the total universe of potential §1203 violations because a
separate table reported claims that were deemed, after investigation, not to reach the level
of §1203 violations, but which, in most cases, resulted in serious administrative action
(including terminations). In Table 27, these violations (although not technically §1203
violations) are listed in order of severity of the resolution disposition:
Table 27
Disposition of Violations
(Not technically §1203 Misconduct)
§1203 Violations Total
%
Cumulative
Removals
15 1.45%
1.45%
Separation
25 2.42%
3.87%
Suspension
55 5.32%
9.19%
Reprimand
116 11.22%
20.41%
Counseling Written
339 32.79%
53.19%
Counseling Oral
62 6.00%
59.19%
Table Continued
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%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
2.0%
0.2%
1.2%
0.0%
78.8%
14.5%
2.7%

Administrative
Retired
Other
Total

162
80
180
1,034

15.67%
7.74%
17.41%
100.00%

74.85%
82.59%
100.00%

The IRS contends that §1203 violation costs (employee morale, employee enforcement
aggressiveness and management implementation) are not worth the cost for only 409 violations;
however, this IRS portrayal severely understates the true number. An additional 1,034
employees received disciplinary action within the context of this code section. This table is a
modification of an IRS table provided as a result of a 2003 JCT (158) data request.

Table 26 shows that in addition to the censure of 409 employees under §1203 violations,
another 1,000 plus received some form of disciplinary action (ranging from removal to
oral counseling).
Congressional passage of §1203 was a clear product of Congressional hearings
that highlighted IRS auditors aggressively pursuing taxpayers (particularly non-filers)
when IRS employees themselves were not filing. Adding substantial weight to this
authority, the 1998 IRS Reform Act clearly states that only the IRS Commissioner can
mitigate termination under this section, and his decision is non-delegable.
The IRS in 2003 highlighted that only 409 employees have actually been fully
censured under §1203 and strongly implied that certain parts of this section have costs
that clearly outweigh the benefits. The IRS stated in a JCT data request (2003, 147):

The overall objective of §1203 was to ensure that employees who commit
serious misconduct are removed from Federal employment. The discretion of
IRS managers was limited, as was the employee’s ability to have a third party
review the penalty determination. The §1203 penalties have been applied most
frequently in cases involving employee tax compliance— fewer than 7% of the
substantiated allegations involve the other eight §1203 provisions. … Seventyfive percent of the tax compliance cases result in mitigation of penalty … The
effectiveness of the law is compromised by overly broad language in the law
that encompasses these cases.
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The IRS in its 2003 budget request sought to have revisions made to the filing section
violations (among other §1203 changes). The JCT stated (2003, 48), “According to the
IRS, such changes are necessary because §1203 is negatively affecting employee morale
and effectiveness.”

These sub-sections call for employee termination, and they

specifically read (1998 IRS Reform Act, §1203):
(8) Willful failure to file any return of tax required under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 on or before the date prescribed therefore (including any
extensions), unless such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful
neglect;
(9) Willful understatement of Federal tax liability, unless such understatement is
due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect;
Ironically, as the IRS was seeking to modify these sections, over 800 of its employees
were identified as potentially taking inappropriate Schedule C deductions. This scam
came to light in an initial review of 25 returns in which a systematic pattern of
inappropriate deductions was identified.
Evidently the IRS is backing off its request for modifications of §1203 as its
January 2, 2004 new release is titled, “IRS Strengthens Employee Tax Compliance
Program.” The release observed that the 1998 IRS Reform Act requires termination of
employees who misreport or do not file a return. A direct quote from IRS Commissioner
Mark Everson indicates a change in position, and it states (IRS 2004, 1):
I am disappointed that a small but unacceptable number of our employees have
generated false business deductions to reduce their taxes. We have a zero
tolerance standard for abuse of the tax laws by employees. As administrators of
the tax system, our employees must maintain the absolute highest standards
when it comes to their own taxes.

Paradoxically, the original Congressional intent of §1203 now appears to be the IRS
company line. Americans do indeed deserve and expect IRS employees to have the
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“highest standards when it comes to their own taxes,” not a scaled down version, as the
IRS was seeking in 2003.
IRS Personnel Environment Results in the Context of NPM
Adoption of a new NPM requires an agency organizational structure to become
more competitive and business-like. In other words, a private market focus is to be
incorporated in the organization. When Congress passed the 1998 IRS Reform Act, it
specifically recognized this issue relative to top IRS management compensation, and thus
gave the U.S. Treasury Secretary broad authority in setting compensation levels for
senior level management. Unfortunately, it also arbitrarily capped compensation to no
more than the U.S. Vice President’s compensation. This restriction means that IRS
senior level management is underpaid by 15 percent as compared to the private sector.
This compensation deficiency no doubt adds to retention problems for the IRS. For
example, senior IRS management hired under this initiative have a 35 percent attrition
rate. The cost of this failure to match private sector compensation has a meaningful
impact on IRS administration. For example, the IRS’s core taxpayer computer files (over
175 million in 2003) are still maintained on a “1960 magnetic tape based system” and the
IRS contends that its inability to hire and/or retain high level information technology
managers is a primary cause of its inability to upgrade its core computer system.
The 1998 IRS Reform Act sought to increase the IRS’s responsiveness to
taxpayers, in part, by requiring IRS employee termination when grievous treatment of
taxpayers by an IRS employee occurred. In 2003, the IRS portrayed this employee
termination provision as problematic and indicated that it resulted in little direct action
but consumed an enormous amount of management resources. However, analysis of the
IRS supplied data showed that this provision did have a greater effect both directly and
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indirectly than the IRS portrayed. In 2004, the IRS reversed course on this provision
when an IRS filing scandal was uncovered and the IRS observed the importance of this
provision. NPM dictates that agency constituents see a responsive agency that treats
individuals fairly. An analysis of “Subtitle C-Personnel Flexibilities” indicates that the
provision that requires high standards for all IRS employees has affected IRS personnel
decisions more than the IRS portrayed to Congress in 2003.
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CHAPTER 6. COMPREHENSIVE IMPLICATIONS
Through multiple research methodologies, the effects of the 1998 IRS Reform Act
were assessed. Congressional intent was crystal clear in the passage of this legislation, in
that the first two sections of the Act were titled, “Sec. 1001. Reorganization of the
Internal Revenue Service” and the second section was titled, “Sec. 1002. Internal
Revenue Service Mission to Focus on Taxpayers’ Needs.” Thus, the IRS was faced with
a Congressional mandate that it adopt a NPM methodology, specifically the core values
of “responsiveness to customers” and treating taxpayers as “customers” (Rosenbloom and
Kravchuk 2002, 39).
Six years after the overwhelming passage of this Act, a full and comprehensive
assessment of this landmark legislation is necessary. This dissertation has focused on the
three strategic goals (service, enforcement, and the IRS’s personnel environment) that the
IRS adopted to implement the sweeping Congressional mandate for fundamental reform.
This dissertation is flowcharted from the commencement to the conclusion in Figure 18.
The three strategic goals of the IRS were directly implemented by the IRS with
the radical adoption of an NPM methodology to the administration of the tax code. The
IRS from 1952 to 1998 utilized a traditional management approach to tax administration.
The IRS (2000)29 observed:
In the late 1990s, however, the IRS was the subject of intense scrutiny and
criticism. A Presidential commission, Congress, and the Vice President's
National Partnership for Reinventing Government looked closely into the way
the IRS did its work. The overall finding was that the IRS was expected to do a
far better job in serving the public, based on a much better understanding of the
taxpayers' point of view.

29

This cite is from the cover page on the IRS web site on Modernizing America’s Tax Agency,
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98170,00.html, on 9/16/04.
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1998 IRS Reform Act

IRS Establishes
Three Strategic Goals

Taxpayer
Service

Taxpayer
Compliance

IRS
Personnel

Environment

H2: No
change in
taxpayers’
compliance

H1: No
change in
taxpayers’
perceptions of
service

H3: No change
in IRS’s
employee work
environment

Mixed results

Decrease in
taxpayers’
perception of IRS

* Fewer auditors
related to greater tax
gap
*1998 Act related to
better compliance

Mixed results

* Private pay parity not
achieved
* Employee
termination provision
effective

Key Congressional intent for better taxpayer service has not been achieved to
date. Compliance and IRS Employee provisions had mixed results.
Figure 18
Summary Flowchart of the Dissertation
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As observed in the NPM section of this dissertation, former Vice President Al Gore’s
National Partnership for Reinventing Government was “the Clinton administration’s
manifestation of the NPM approach.” The implications of tax policy changes made under
the framework of NPM can now be assessed.
Partial replication of the 1990 IRS Taxpayer Opinion Survey clearly indicates that
taxpayers did not perceive they were receiving top quality service, as specifically called
for in the IRS mission statement (radically transformed in 1998 to focus on service). In
fact, the IRS received a universal decrease in the highest ratings categories and
significantly decreased scores in two of the six categories mean scores that specifically
evaluated the IRS’s implementation of NPM methodology.

Thus, the IRS’s

implementation of NPM is perceived as unsuccessful by those taxpayers surveyed
(especially since the IRS established “top quality service” as its first strategic goal in
response to the 1998 IRS Reform Act)
Interestingly, taxpayers rated the overall taxation system better in 2004 than in
1990. Taxpayers’ perceptions of unrealistically high audit rates approaching 20 percent
were recorded in both the 2004 and 1990 surveys.

There appear to be different

perceptions of the IRS based on the tax forms that survey respondents filed, and this
indicated result would be an interesting avenue for further research. Overall, the results
strongly indicate that the IRS is not perceived by the taxpayers to have successfully
instituted NPM.
Taxpayer compliance was modeled utilizing the Bureau of Economic Advisors
estimates of the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap. This income estimate was then
compared to the AGI taxpayers actually report to the IRS.
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A varying gap of

approximately 11 percent was present from 1998 to 2001. There were significant
correlations among the enforcement variables studied (audit personnel, tax litigation,
audit hours and audit changes) and the 1998 IRS Reform Act. In subsequent multivariate
modeling, both the audit variable (ADT) and the IRS Reform Act (R98) were
significantly related to the income reporting gap.

The audit variable (ADT) was

negatively related to the tax gap indicating that fewer auditors lead to a greater reporting
gap.
The opposite and interesting result was seen in the 1998 IRS Reform Act variable
(R98). The 1998 IRS Reform Act was negatively related to the tax gap, indicating that
the 1998 IRS Reform Act is related to a decrease in the tax gap. One implication is that
Congressional concern over having a responsive IRS was justified, and the overall effect
of the 1998 IRS Reform Act is better voluntary tax compliance on the part of taxpayers
(not withstanding the survey results). This result is interesting, in that taxpayers rated the
overall tax system as fairer in the 2004 survey. With additional data points (which will
become available in subsequent years), this result can be better measured and assessed. If
this result holds, on the central NPM tenet of treating individuals as customers instead of
impersonal actors has resulted in a “better functioning government” (Bagby and Franke).
IRS senior executives do not have pay parity with the private sector.

A

significant and practical difference in compensation remains, despite the 1998 IRS
Reform Act specifically granting critical pay authority under §1201 to the Secretary of
the Treasury. However, the Secretary of the Treasury utilized the provision to the full
extent. Congress capped compensation levels so that they did not exceed the Vice
President of the United States’ salary.

The IRS, with a 1960’s information based
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technology infrastructure, would seem in desperate need of private sector talent.
Executives receiving the enhanced compensation still had a nearly 30 percent turnover
rate. The failure to achieve compensation parity prevents full implementation of NPM
(competitive market focus).
The 1998 IRS Reform Act directly resulted from Congressional hearings led by
the late Senator William Roth, Jr. The IRS was heavily criticized because auditors
forcefully went after non-filers when some IRS employees themselves were not filing tax
returns. This paradoxical situation directly resulted in Congress enacting §1203. This
section listed violations that IRS employees would be terminated for, barring direct
intervention by the Commissioner of the IRS (at his or her “sole discretion”).
In 2003, the IRS portrayed the effect of part of this termination section as causing
more problems than it was worth. However, assessing the IRS’s supporting data reveals
that many violations that did not reach the §1203 threshold were nevertheless of a serious
magnitude (the IRS downplayed this reality).

Interestingly, the IRS has apparently

reversed course on modifying §1203 (after revelations of an IRS employees’ filing
scandal). As of 2004, the IRS appears to have come full circle back to the ideals of the
1998 IRS Reform Act that demanded that IRS employees have the highest reporting
standards. Based on IRS supplied data, it is apparent that §1203 has been utilized to
address employee misconduct more than the IRS portrayed in 2003. A central tenet for
NPM is for an agency to treat individuals fairly and §1203 appears to accomplish this.
Overall, integrating these results shows that the 1998 IRS Reform Act has failed
to improve taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS. Taxpayer compliance, as measured by the
BEA-AGI gap, appears to have improved since 1998, but the number of auditors has
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materially declined. The IRS’s personnel environment is still not at the level where
Congress wanted. In summation, the IRS implementation of NPM has had mixed results,
however on the central IRS’s goal of providing “top quality service” the survey results
strongly indicate that the IRS has been unsuccessful to date.
6.1 Limitations
Tax legislation is generally enacted on an annual basis. Thus, tax policy occurs in
a highly charged political environment and any tax policy study is subject to this political
reality. The present post-1998 IRS Reform Act survey replication is based on the 1990
IRS Taxpayer Opinion Survey. The 1998 IRS Reform Act was thus passed eight years
after the initial survey. Ideally, the 1990 survey would have been conducted closer to
1998. However, if it had been conducted too close in time, the proximity in time would
have caused problems as well (taxpayers likely would have had a heightened awareness
of the IRS’s transgressions leading up to the 1998 IRS Reform Act).
If a survey had been done in 1998, it may have shown higher taxpayer
dissatisfaction with the IRS than was observed in 1990.

Therefore, taxpayers’

perceptions of the IRS could have improved since 1998 and this would not be reflected in
the 1990/2004 comparison. Additionally, a further limitation is that the effects of the
1998 IRS Tax Reform Act may be longer term in nature and thus are not observable at
this point in time. However, in the 2004 survey, the IRS received far from “top quality”
service marks, and, in fact, had a universal decrease in the most favorable categories.
Taxpayer compliance data lacks complete data streams. Only four years of data
after the 1998 IRS Reform Act are currently available. Additionally, the audit hour
variable (HRS) and audit change variable (CHG) are only available back to 1992. The
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IRS personnel environment hypothesis had only limited data to be tested although the
results were statistically significant. The above factors limit the implications for this
study, as well as most academic studies in tax policy.

By utilizing several research

methodologies, these limitations are mitigated to a good degree.
6.2 Contributions
The IRS, with nearly $2 trillion in annual cash flow, has twice the aggregate
revenue of the ten largest U.S. Corporations. Thus, in its own right, the degrees of the
IRS’s implementation of legislatively mandated changes in tax policy have major
economic ramifications. In 2002, the IRS collected $1.8 trillion in total tax revenue. The
IRS officially estimated annual non-compliance on a tax revenue basis at a material $250
to $300 billion (GAO 2002B, 51), approximately 15 percent of total tax revenues. The
implications of this “tax slippage” for a tax system built primarily on voluntary
compliance should not be understated.
This study adds to the understanding of the implications of instituting tax policy
changes made under the framework of NPM. The IRS bureaucracy, prior to the 1998
IRS Reform Act, was administered within a rigorous impersonal traditional management
structure. The 1998 IRS Reform Act legislatively mandated the IRS to adopt an NPM
orientation in administering the IRC in order to become more responsive to taxpayers
(service oriented).

Using different methodological approaches, this dissertation

ascertained the effects on federal tax administration of switching from a traditional
management approach to an NPM approach.
Investigating the aggregate effect of the momentous 1998 IRS Reform Act is in
and of itself a meaningful contribution. The utilization of a partial replication of the
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IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey allowed for long-term assessments of public
perceptions on the IRS’s administration.

This dissertation contributes to an

understanding of the process of taxation within the reality of a long-term political
environment. The combination of these analyses with the legislative mandate for the IRS
to track its progress in achieving the goals set forth in the 1998 IRS Reform Act provided
for a rich data source.
The study is exploratory in nature, in that the data contained within the
Congressional Reviews of the 1998 IRS Reform Act has mostly not been utilized in a tax
accounting research context. Incorporating the Bureau of Economic Analysis - Adjusted
Gross Income (BEA-AGI) Gap (as a measure of the tax-reporting gap) with the JCTidentified enforcement variables results in a unique data stream combination. The IRS
often contends that there is no longer an updated long-term measure of tax compliance
since the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program was terminated in 1988.30
Often tax research focuses on a particular change in a particular year. However,
that approach fails to address the overall dynamics of the taxation process, which is
subject to a continuously changing environment. The testing of a governmental policy
implemented under NPM will potentially affect forthcoming tax reform initiatives and
allow for the prediction of effects of legislative changes (i.e., positive accounting theory).
Overall, this research contributed to an examination of U.S. tax policy by centering on a
unique event. Moving the tax system towards an NPM methodology was hypothesized to
have materially affected U.S. tax administration. This dissertation found statistically
significant results in all three areas that centered on the IRS’s three strategic goals that
were established to specifically implement the congressional mandate established in the
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1998 IRS Reform Act. Utilization of different methodological approaches resulted in the
triangulation of data results.
Passage of the 1998 IRS Reform Act and subsequent changes have not altered
taxpayers’ opinions within the context of the partial replication of the 1990 Taxpayer
Opinion Survey. If taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS had improved, the change should
have been detected in the 2004 survey. Analyses of tax compliance after the 1998 IRS
Reform Act present a mixed picture. The 1998 IRS Reform Act appears significantly
related to a decrease in the tax-reporting gap (more outer year data is needed to confirm
these results). However, the number of tax auditors is significantly related to the tax gap
(more auditors are related to better tax compliance). IRS senior executives do not receive
private sector pay parity, despite the 1998 IRS Reform Act §1201 specifically addressing
this problem. The intent for IRS employees to strictly adhere to filing tax returns, as
mandated under the 1998 IRS Reform Act §1203, has proven reasonable, despite IRS
calls in its 2003 budget request for §1203 modifications.

Fortunately this call has

apparently been rescinded.
6.3 Contributions from a NPM Perspective
From an NPM perspective, the IRS’s implementation of this management
paradigm has produced mixed results. Concerning the critical aspect of taxpayer service,
the survey results clearly indicate that those taxpayers surveyed do not perceive that they
are receiving “top quality service.” Congress mandated that the IRS adopt a customer
service focus in the second section of the 1998 IRS Reform Act (§1002 was titled
“Internal Revenue Service Mission to Focus on Taxpayers Needs”). The IRS’s first

30

See supra, note 4.
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strategic goal, after the 1998 IRS Reform Act was to provide “top quality service to each
taxpayer” (JCT 2003, 1).
An analysis of the compliance data produced a mixed picture as to the IRS’s
success in implementing NPM. After the 1998 IRS Reform Act, initial data indicates
better tax reporting by taxpayers. Thus, a “better functioning government” may have
occurred from a collection perspective. However, after the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the
number of IRS tax auditors declined further and associated key enforcement measures
continued to decline. The data indicated that the number of tax auditors is inversely
related to the tax reporting gap.
From the IRS’s personnel environment perspective, the IRS continues to lack
private pay parity.

Under a NPM orientation, an organization should become

“competitive” and more “firm like.” The 1998 IRS Reform Act mandated that IRS
employees face expedited terminations if they infringed on taxpayers’ rights. From a
“responsiveness to customers” perspective, this section has had considerably more impact
than the IRS initially portrayed to Congress in 2003 (the IRS essentially recanted this
assertion in 2004).
Overall, the IRS’s implementation of NPM can be considered unsuccessful to a
great degree. Taxpayers do not perceive they are receiving “top quality service” and this
was a fundamental objective of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.

In fact, Congressional

hearings, which were the catalyst for the 1998 IRS Reform Act, highlighted taxpayer
abuse by the IRS. The IRS shifted resources as mandated in this Tax Act, resulting in
continued and accelerated erosion of IRS enforcement activities as reflected in Figures 12
through 16.
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APPENDIX I MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE1998 IRS REFORM ACT

Relevant Reform Provisions
Title
Heading
(From index, many direct quotes)
I
Reorganization of Structure  Change in mission
&
 IRS Oversight Board & Taxpayer Advocate
Management of the IRS
 IRS Commissioner tenure
 Treasury Office of Inspector General
 Executive branch influence & IRS personnel
II
Electronic Filing
 E-filing of tax & information returns
 Paperless e-filing
 Return free tax system by 2007
 Access to account information
III
Taxpayer Protection & Rights  Burden of proof
o Fundamental element of prior IRC
o Judicially, not legislatively
created
o Taxpayer needs credible evidence
 Taxpayers expanded proceedings
 Innocent spouse, interest & penalties relief
 Audit rights, examinations, and collections
 Studies
IV
Congressional Accountability  GAO studies reviews
for the IRS
 Joint congressional oversight reports
 Y2K funding
 Tax law complexity analysis
V
Additional Provisions,
 Miscellaneous provisions
Through Technical Corrections (1997),  Repeal 18 month holding period
VIII
etc.
 Child credit stacking changes, etc.
Source: JCT 1998.
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APPENDIX II MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Traditional
Management

New Public
Management

Values

Economy, efficiency,
effectiveness

Cost-effectiveness,
responsiveness to customers

Organizational
Structure

Ideal-typical
bureaucracy

Competitive,
firm-like

View of
Individual

Impersonal case, rational
actor

Customer

Cognitive
Approach

Rational-scientific

Theory, observation,
measurement,
experimentation

Budgeting

Rational
(cost-benefit)

Performance-based,
market driven

Decision
Making

Rationalcomprehensive

Decentralized,
cost-minimizing

Characteristic

This table adapted directly from Rosenbloom and Kravchuk (2002, 39).
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APPENDIX III SURVEY INSTRUMENT
1. What is your state of residence_________________
2. Have you already filed a federal income tax return for last year – that is 2003 – or are
you planning to file an income tax return?
3. Below are a number of statements about the IRS. Please tell me how much you agree

or disagree with each one. Just indicate the number that best describes your feelings.
1
Strongly
Agree
Score

2
Agree

3
Somewhat
Agree

4
Somewhat
Disagree

5
Disagree

6
Strongly
Disagree

NS
Not
Sure

Question
An IRS employee is just as knowledgeable as any private tax expert.
You can be confident that the IRS would never try to take more money from
me than it should.
You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records.
When it comes to investigating its own people, the IRS is as thorough as it is
with everyone else.
Employees who work for the IRS display a high degree of honesty and
integrity.
IRS procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect the
rights of taxpayers.

Circle the most appropriate answer
4. How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to the 2003 tax
return – do you feel it is quite fair to most people, or reasonably fair, or somewhat
unfair, or quite unfair to most people?
5. During the past few years, how often have you completed your tax form yourself,
instead of getting help from someone else? Would you say you always do them
yourself, usually do, sometimes do or never do them yourself?
6. An audit is when the IRS asks you to prove your deductions or answer questions
about your tax return (either in person or through the mail). Out of every 100
taxpayers at your income level, what percent do you think were audited last year?
7. Which of the following forms did you use the last time you filed?
a. 1040-EZ (short form)
b. 1040-A (regular short-form)
c. 1040 (long form)
d. 1040 (long form) plus additional forms and/or schedules
e. Don’t remember

103

APPENDIX IV ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME GAP
(In billions)
BEAIRSAGI
GAP % of
Year
AGI
AGI
GAP
BEA- AGI
1981 $2,016 $1,773
$243
12.05%
1982 $2,099 $1,852
$247
11.77%
1983 $2,226 $1,943
$283
12.71%
1984 $2,473 $2,140
$333
13.47%
1985 $2,632 $2,306
$326
12.39%
1986 $2,853 $2,482
$371
13.00%
1987 $3,121 $2,774
$347
11.12%
1988 $3,412 $3,083
$329
9.64%
1989 $3,650 $3,256
$394
10.79%
1990 $3,798 $3,405
$393
10.35%
1991 $3,857 $3,465
$392
10.16%
1992 $4,092 $3,629
$463
11.31%
1993 $4,245 $3,723
$522
12.30%
1994 $4,474 $3,908
$566
12.65%
1995 $4,760 $4,189
$571
12.00%
1996 $5,145 $4,536
$609
11.84%
1997 $5,578 $4,970
$608
10.90%
1998 $6,120 $5,416
$704
11.50%
1999 $6,554 $5,856
$698
10.65%
2000 $7,125 $6,365
$760
10.67%
2001 $6,983 $6,171
$812
11.63%
This Appendix compares the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Adjusted Gross Income (BEAAGI), and the Internal Revenue Service Adjusted Gross Income (IRS-AGI) to calculate an AGIGap (a proxy for taxpayer compliance). In order to avoid inflationary impacts, AGI-Gap is
converted to a percentage basis (AGI-Gap divided by the BEA-AGI).
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APPENDIX V IRS ENFORCEMENT DATA

Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Total IRS
Employees
85,672
83,835
90,108
95,749
96,705
102,206
114,018
123,198
113,622
116,425
119,213
114,819
110,680
109,505
114,064
102,082
97,404
97,375
97,526
97,464
100,577

Audit
Audited
Agents &
Returns With
Auditors Prosecution Hours
Changes
17,216
1,431
17,294
1,185
17,354
1,060
16,864
1,339
17,070
1,361
16,911
1,547
18,049
1,550
19,801
1,393
19,813
1,190
18,529
1,206
18,580
1,066
18,651
1,015
10.1
632,331
18,097
1,011
8.9
662,232
17,666
931
8.1
752,293
18,601
850
8.4
717,066
17,957
847
9.7
668,133
16,935
873
9.5
619,931
15,815
766
9.8
473,116
14,961
722
11.7
329,494
14,216
632
14.4
215,298
13,510
503
16.0
170,439

The above Appendix shows the key IRS enforcement variables used for analysis of taxpayer
compliance. This data is from JCT reports, the IRS’s Internet statistical section site, and
University of Syracuse’s TRAC data.
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APPENDIX VI IRS’S EXECUTIVE SALARIES
Individual
Adams, Robert
Allen, Maureen
Ayres, James
Berg, Doug
Boswell, William
Bratton, Delena
Chesman, Michael
Claytor, Paul
Dobbins, Tom
Duder, John
Dunahoo, Carol
Forman, Fred
Gaur, Prashant
Horsey, Daniel
Jakabcin, George
Jernigan, Cliff
Kist, Franklin
Leighty, Colleen
Liuzzi, John
Meier, Kurt
Olson, Nina
Porter, William
Pursley, Mark

Before IRS Total IRS
$167,269
$186,300
80,000
150,000
203,179
192,600
240,975
186,300
500,000
192,600
92,016
153,000
615,300
186,300
197,000
186,300
149,537
185,100
176,000
192,600
334,000
192,600
622,700
192,600
255,000
190,000
196,685
180,000
109,201
140,000
206,847
181,400
591,661
180,000
154,614
161,000
195,000
192,600
207,000
186,300
95,000
135,000
107,346
180,000
135,000

165,500

Difference
($19,031)
($70,000)
$10,579
$54,675
$307,400
($60,984)
$429,000
$10,700
($35,563)
($16,600)
$141,400
$430,100
$65,000
$16,685
($30,799)
$25,447
$411,661
($6,386)
$2,400
$20,700
($40,000)
($72,654)
($30,500)

Ratcliffe, Wilbur
342,341
186,300
$156,041
Shultz, Paul
186,000
181,400
$4,600
St. Jacques, Michael
65,400
150,000
($84,600)
Stricklin, H. James
125,000
165,000
($40,000)
This Appendix lists IRS’s executives hired under §1201 critical pay authority.
Their pay immediately prior to joining the IRS is compared to their IRS salary.
This data was provided by the IRS per a JCT 2003 data (132) request.
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Individual
Terry, Thomas
Toder, Eric
Tootson, Jack
Warren, Margaret
Wisniewski, Brenda
Conklin, Bert
Conti, Vincent
Cosgrave, Paul
Cunninghame, Donna
Eads, James
Kehoe, Joseph
LaFaver, John
Langdon, Larry
Liberti, Thomas
Matthews, Mark
Mazei, Albert
Myers, Shelly
Oveson, Wilford
Reece, John
Rinaldi, Jim
Rosenker, Heather
Yuckenberg, Timothy

Before IRS
$199,958
147,000
205,016
93,333
363,600
204,750
160,000

Total IRS
$186,300
165,000
192,600
150,000
192,600
181,400
135,000

Difference
$13,658
($18,000)
$12,416
($56,667)
$171,000
$23,350
$25,000

463,000
118,400
355,717
1,000,000
90,000
650,000
228,700
185,000
220,000
115,529
85,107
219,811
308,118
150,000
243,413

181,400
147,500
192,600
192,600
155,100
192,600
181,400

$281,600
($29,100)
$163,117
$807,400
($65,100)
$457,400
$47,300
($7,000)
$60,000
($14,471)
($59,693)
$27,211
$121,818
($15,000)
$57,113

192,000
160,000
130,000
144,800
192,600
186,300
165,000
186,300

Total
$12,156,523 $8,573,900 ($3,582,623)
This Appendix lists IRS’s executives hired under §1201 critical pay authority.
Their pay immediately prior to joining the IRS is compared to their IRS salary.
This data was provided by the IRS per a JCT 2003 data (132) request.
(Continued from previous page.)
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VITA
William

Meriwether

VanDenburgh

received

a

bachelor

of

Business

Administration degree from Millsaps College, in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1988. He is a
Certified Public Accountant (inactive) in Louisiana and is an Enrolled Agent (licensed to
practice before the IRS). In 1991, he received a Master of Business Administration
degree from Loyola University in New Orleans, Louisiana. He received a Master of
Science degree in accounting – taxation option from the University of New Orleans
(UNO) in 1997. At UNO, he served as an accounting instructor for two semesters after
graduation.

In 2000, he entered the Louisiana State University Department of

Accounting doctoral program. His minor is public administration. Mr. VanDenburgh
has accepted a position as an Assistant Professor of Accounting at UNO starting in
August of 2004.
Mr. VanDenburgh has published 26 articles in a variety of accounting and tax
journals (academic, policy, and practitioner). His work has appeared in Advances in
Taxation (2 in total), The CPA Journal (3 in total), The Journal of Accountancy, and Tax
Notes (9 in total), among other journals.
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